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ABSTRACT 
Although anti-terror financing efforts have yielded positive results, national and 
international guidelines that are in place to stem the flow of funds can have unintended 
consequences on legitimate business, charitable organizations, and communities in 
general.  Specifically for Islamic charitable organizations, the negative effects are 
particularly bad because charities many times are created and operate in areas that 
support communities both affected by and interconnected with conflict.  Islamic charities 
have drawn scrutiny after the attacks on September 11, 2001 and their ability to operate 
in the United States and elsewhere have run into roadblocks associated with anti-terror 
financing regulations.  Several countries including the United States have started to 
regulate and monitor these organizations in an effort to stem the flow of funds to terrorist 
organizations.  Yet, the policies can have an overall negative effect on the capability of 
these organizations to operate in the perceived constrained environment because of donor 
fear of being associated with Islamic charities, fear that donations will be misused, and/or 
fear from government retribution.  This thesis will explore the trade-offs involved for 
shutting off the funding to Islamic charities and determine if a balance can be struck 



























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION TO ISSUES ARISING FROM ANTI-   TERROR 
FINANCING GUIDELINES FOR CHARITIES .....................................................1 
A. BACKGROUND AND SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM.................................1 
1. Terrorist Financing Apparatus ..........................................................2 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................3 
1.   Overview of ATF Policies....................................................................4 
C.   FRAMING ATF POLICY AND ISLAMIC CHARITY 
DISCONNECTS AND THESIS ROADMAP................................................8 
II. ISLAMIC CHARITIES.............................................................................................11 
A. IMPORTANCE OF CHARITABLE GIVING IN ISLAM........................11 
1. Waqf, Sadaqa & Zakat......................................................................12 
B. EMERGENCE AND MANAGEMENT OF ORGANIZATIONS TO 
DISPERSE DONATIONS IN ISLAMIC SOCIETIES ..............................14 
1. Humanitarian versus Terrorist Causes ...........................................16 
2.  Role of Wahhabism and Salafism in Proliferation of Islamic 
Ideas ....................................................................................................18 
a. Madrassas (Religious Schools)...............................................20 
C. ROLE OF ISLAMIC CHARITIES IN ISLAMIC AND NON-
ISLAMIC STATES........................................................................................22 
1. Saudi Arabia.......................................................................................23 
2. United States.......................................................................................25 
3. Sudan...................................................................................................25 
D. THE EFFECTS OF ATF POLICIES ON ISLAMIC CHARITIES .........27 
E. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................31 
III. COMPARATIVE STUDY OF REGULATING CHARITIES ACROSS FIVE 
STATES ......................................................................................................................33 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................33 
1. Case Selection .....................................................................................35 
2. Selection of Regulatory Factors........................................................35 
B. COMPARATIVE ANALYISIS OF CASES: SIMILARITIES, 
DIFFERENCES AND CAPABILITY FOR CROSS APPLICATION.....36 
1. United States.......................................................................................36 
a. Degree of Governmental Oversight........................................37 
b. Transparency of Financial Transactions ..............................38 
c. Penalty for Noncompliance ....................................................39 
d. Restriction on Donations ........................................................40 
2.  United Kingdom.................................................................................41 
a.   Degree of Governmental Oversight........................................41 
b. Transparency of Financial Transactions ..............................43 
c. Penalty for Noncompliance ....................................................43 
d. Restriction on Donations ........................................................44 
3. Russia ..................................................................................................46 
viii 
a. Degree of Governmental Oversight........................................46 
b. Transparency of Financial Transactions ..............................47 
c. Penalty for Noncompliance ....................................................48 
d. Restriction on Donations ........................................................49 
4. Sudan...................................................................................................49 
a. Degree of Governmental Oversight........................................50 
b. Transparency of Financial Transactions ..............................50 
c. Penalty for Noncompliance ....................................................51 
d. Restriction on Donations ........................................................51 
5.  Saudi Arabia.......................................................................................52 
a. Degree of Governmental Oversight........................................52 
b. Transparency of Financial Transactions ..............................54 
c. Penalty for Noncompliance ....................................................55 
d. Restriction on Donations ........................................................55 
C. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................56 
IV. LESSONS LEARNED, POLICY PROPOSAL AND OVERALL 
CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................61 
A. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS .......61 
1. Single Agency vs. Multiple Agency Approach ................................62 
2. One Blacklist of International Terrorist Organizations.................62 
3. Well Regulated and Transparent Financial Sector ........................63 
4. Equally Applied Penalties for Noncompliance and Due Process ..64 
B. POLICY OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY MAKERS BASED ON 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS......................................................................65 
1. Increase U.S. Department of the Treasury Resources and 
Personnel for ATF Efforts.................................................................66 
2. Build Partnership between Muslim Community and U.S. 
Government ........................................................................................67 
3. Transform U.S. Policy in Regard to Groups that Do Not Pose a 
Direct Threat to the U.S. to Facilitate Collective International 
Action ..................................................................................................68 
4. Implement Clear Lines of Authority among U.S. Agencies to 
Advocate Clear ATF Policy and Affect Political Will of 
Developing States ...............................................................................70 
C. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................71 
BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................................................................................77 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................85 
 
ix 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Basic Model of Terrorist Financial Networks with Representative 
Activities ............................................................................................................2 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xi 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to take this opportunity to thank my two thesis advisors, Professors 
Trinkunas and Kadhim, who helped me focus on the topic and not stray from the path.  
This product is a result of their expert guidance.  I would also like to acknowledge the 
work of Lara Donohue, Moyara Rueshen, Jacob Shapiro, and Steve Kiser.  Their 
outstanding work in the field of Anti-Terrorist Financing gave me the basis for my work 
in this area.  Finally, I want to thank my family and friends who encouraged me to finish.  























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
1 
I. INTRODUCTION TO ISSUES ARISING FROM ANTI-   
TERROR FINANCING GUIDELINES FOR CHARITIES 
A. BACKGROUND AND SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM 
Finding, identifying, tracking, capturing and prosecuting terrorists are at the 
forefront of national and international interests and subsequent policies.  One subset of 
those policies focuses on tackling terrorist financing as a means for disrupting terrorist 
organizations and prosecuting the offenders.  The reason for this is that terrorist financing 
is not only an indicator but also the source and means of enabling those who carry out 
violent acts.  As President George W. Bush stated on 24 September 2001,  
At 12:01 a.m. this morning, a major thrust of our war on terrorism began 
with the stroke of a pen. Today, we have launched a strike on the financial 
foundation of the global terror network…I’ve signed an executive order 
that immediately freezes United States financial assets of and prohibits 
United States transactions with 27 different entities.  They include terrorist 
organizations, individual terrorist leaders, a corporation that serves as a 
front for terrorism, and several nonprofit organizations…We will starve 
the terrorists of funding, turn them against each other, rout them out of 
their safe hiding places and bring them to justice.1 
Although identifying sources of funding is complex and takes time, tackling 
terrorist financing is an important step in dismantling the terrorist networks that exist 
today and in the future.  This thesis will not address whether the anti-terrorist financing 
(ATF) effort should exist, nor will it address whether information should be used for 
tracking terrorists versus prosecuting terrorists.  This thesis will focus on the ATF 
policies currently in place and the effects of those policies on a segment of society, 
specifically Islamic charities and the people they support or who support them.  Islamic 
charities account for a large portion of humanitarian assistance throughout the world.  
Much of the literature talks about potential trade-offs but lacks robust policy options to 
try and mitigate the costs to the charities.  By exploring the tension between the  
 
 
                                                 
1  See remarks by President George W. Bush. “President Freezes Terrorists’ Asserts”, The Rose 
Garden. 24 September 2001. Available on-line at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/10010924-4.html (accessed 25 September 2006). 
2 
regulations and the Islamic charitable organizations, policy makers will be able to 
understand the trade-offs involved in anti-terror financing policies and potentially 
minimize them. 
1. Terrorist Financing Apparatus 
Understanding how terrorists raise and/or acquire funds to build and maintain 
their organizations and run operations is crucial to analyzing the effects of guidelines and 
policies intent on disrupting them.  Each terrorist organization is different.  Extensive 
research on how terrorists earn, move and store funds does not exist; however, there are a 
few academic sources that have examined the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), 
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE), and the Irish Republican Army (IRA).  
Steve Kiser, in his doctoral dissertation, constructed an analytical framework by which to 
analyze the financial structure of a terrorist network based on the available academic 
knowledge.  Within this framework, he took the information gleaned from the PLO, 
LTTE, and IRA and applied it to terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda.  Figure 1 shows the 
different types of activities that any terrorist organization may engage in when earning, 
moving or storing funds. 
 
 Earning Moving Storing 
Internal Front businesses 
Collecting for fake 
    charities 
Donations at  
    churches/mosques 
Drugs 
Bulk cash smuggling 
Unregistered informal 
     transfer system 
Over/under billing  
     between front  
     businesses 
Conflict  
     gems/gold 
Banks 
sympathetic 
     to group 
External Individual donations 




     accounts 
Table 1.   Basic Model of Terrorist Financial Networks with Representative Activities2 
 
Based on this framework, terrorists have a variety of methods for acquiring funds, 
moving them, and storing them.  Each organization may not necessarily use all of these 
methods, but generally, their methods fall into one or more of these categories.  Yet, 
based on the information gathered on the PLO, LTTE and IRA, there is strong evidence 
                                                 
2  Steve Kiser, “Financing Terror: An Analysis and Simulation for Affecting Al Qaeda's Financial 
Infrastructure” (Doctoral Degree in Public Policy Analysis, Pardee RAND Graduate School), 26, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/2005/RAND_RGSD185.pdf  (accessed 25 April 2006). 
3 
that suggests that one of the major conduits of funds is non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs).  Terrorist organizations may use charities, NGOs and IGOs both as a source of 
funds and as cover for operations in certain regions.3  These non-profit organizations can 
be complicit or aware of the purpose of the funds given to these terrorist networks, or 
they can be infiltrated by a member of the terrorist network, and completely unaware of 
the purpose of the funds siphoned off.  In either case, these NGOs provide a cover for 
terrorist individuals or terrorist operations in all parts of the globe.  By filtering funds 
through legitimate and/or charitable organizations, the money is cleaned and legitimized 
before being used for illegitimate purposes.  Although the money coming into the NGOs 
is not necessarily “dirty” and it is difficult to assign intent to money prior to its use, 
terrorists who utilize NGOs require a legitimate conduit to disguise their true intentions.  
In this sense, the money is laundered, similar to how criminal organizations operate.4   
The scope of terror financing is large and complex.  Yet, the majority of the 
policies focus on anti-money laundering efforts and shutting off access to money and 
money transferring capabilities.  And, while the concept of laundering money can be 
applied to the process of raising and transferring funds through NGOs, since the money 
from charities is not “dirty” to begin with it is difficult to track and monitor funds until 
used by a designated group or person for nefarious purposes.  In addition, much of the 
evidence shows that a large portion of the money attained by terrorist organizations 
flowing through charities is difficult to trace since these organizations have little to know 
accountability requirements.  Finally, “It may be difficult to establish that either the 
purpose or the effect of financing such an organization will be to support terrorist 
activity.”5   
B. LITERATURE REVIEW   
Since the existing apparatus for addressing financial crime was built during the 
1990s to deal principally with money laundering, the natural progression in the wake of                                                  
3  Steve Kiser, “Financing Terror: An Analysis and Simulation for Affecting Al Qaeda's Financial 
Infrastructure” (Doctoral Degree in Public Policy Analysis, Pardee RAND Graduate School), 35-53, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/2005/RAND_RGSD185.pdf  (accessed 25 April 2006).  
4  Information acquired during Terrorist Financing graduate class at NPS given by Jacob Shapiro, 2 
May 2006. 
5  Kevin E. Davis, “The Financial War on Terrorism” in Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy, eds. 
Victor V. Ramraj, Michael Hor and Kent Roach, 1st ed., Vol. 1 (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 184. 
4 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks was to modify it to include tracing of funds through charitable 
organizations.  In addition to tracing funds through anti-money laundering efforts, 
charities and other NGOs are encouraged to abide by regulatory guidelines.  Current 
regulatory efforts focus on encouraging charities to abide by ATF regulations and are 
promised prosecution at the worst and investigation as a minimum if they do not comply.  
Although ATF regulations and guidelines are applied to all charities and NGOs in a 
blanket fashion, there is evidence that the majority of the focus of ATF investigations has 
centered on Islamic charities.6  As a result, ATF regulations run the risk of shutting off 
funding for legitimate Islamic charitable organizations either wittingly or unwittingly due 
to fear from its constituency base.  This may have unintended consequences for the 
overall U.S. anti-terrorism strategy by undermining moderates, engendering poverty and 
hopelessness that contribute to terrorist recruiting, alienating strategic allies, etc. 
1.   Overview of ATF Policies 
Recent research shows that the main focus of ATF policy has been to freeze 
alleged terrorist assets from “tactically targeted” groups and individuals.  Many of the 
policies require little proof before assets are frozen and groups are blacklisted.  This has a 
potentially detrimental effect on legitimate humanitarian organizations, as Robert Looney 
suggests in his article titled “The Mirage of Terrorist Financing: The Case of Islamic 
Charities”.   Identifying charities that have nefarious intentions and then tracking the 
money can be difficult.  The difficulty stems from the fact that charities have been used 
in two different ways.  They have either been exploited by unscrupulous workers, or were 
founded specifically as a front masking terrorist activities.7  Islamic charities are 
particularly vulnerable targets for terrorist fundraising because funds collected for zakat 
or sadaqa can be used for, “…everything from jihad to assisting the poor and feeding the 
needy.”8  As a result, Islamic charities many times are raising funds for causes that are 
contrary to Western interests in the Middle East.  In addition,  
                                                 
6  “A Year of Attacks on Advocacy, Flawed Anti-Terrorism Measures,” The Watcher, 13 December 
2005, 1, http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/3215/1/408 (accessed 28 March 2006). 
7  Robert Looney, “The Mirage of Terrorist Financing: The Case of Islamic Charities,” Strategic 
Insights V, no. 3 (March 2006), 3, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2006/Mar/looneyMar06.asp (accessed 
13 April 2006). 
8  J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, Alms for Jihad, 1st ed., Vol. 1 (Cambridge, New York, 
Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, Sao Paulo: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 18. 
5 
donations in large measure remain anonymous.  Both conditions combined 
with the often opaque financial and operating structure of Islamic charities 
provide an ideal environment for exploitation by terrorist groups.9   
In either case, tracking funds through charities and proving that the money was in turn 
used to fund terrorist organizations is extremely difficult owing to the “fungibility” of the 
money.10   As a result, charity assets have been frozen or they have been shut down, 
whether guilty or not, in an effort to “do something” about the problem. The proposed 
solutions suggest a different approach to the problem.  Looney concludes that increasing 
government understanding of cultural requirements for charitable donation, increasing 
donor understanding and accountability, encouraging organizations that offer alternatives 
to radical Islam, and approaching ATF from an intelligence/information gathering 
approach rather than a search-and-seize approach would yield better results.11   
Additional research also suggests that the difficulty in tracking funds through 
Islamic charities is compounded by western misunderstanding of Islam in general and 
Arab governments in particular.  A less aggressive stance combined with incentives for 
collective action would have yielded more than the seize-and-freeze stance that Western 
states have used regarding ATF policies.  Moyara de Moraes Ruehsen, in her article 
“Arab Government Responses to the Threat of Terrorist Financing”, indicated that “The 
prevailing attitude in the Arab world shifted from sympathy to defensiveness (after 9/11) 
and a reluctance to cooperate with Western investigations and strengthen financial sector 
regulations.”12  This defensiveness stemmed from the quick seize-and-freeze actions 
taken directly after the 9/11 attacks, which focused almost exclusively on Islamic groups.  
Ruehsen called this “guilt by association”.  Ruehsen’s article also suggests that although 
Arab governments acknowledge that funds sometimes flow through Islamic charities into 
the hands of terrorists, and those governments may be willing to enact regulations on 
stronger charity accountability, the implementation and enforcement of those regulations 
                                                 
9  Looney, “The Mirage of Terrorist Financing: The Case of Islamic Charities,” 2. 
10  Ibid., 3. 
11  Ibid., 10. 
12  Moyara de Moraes Ruehsen, “Arab Government Response to the Threat of Terrorist Financing” in 
Terrorist Financing and State Response, eds. Jeane Giraldo and Harold Trinkunas, 1st ed., Vol. 1 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2006), 3 (accessed 12 May 2006). 
6 
are slow to take place.13  The conclusion is that a collective and coherent international 
response is necessary to succeed in stemming the flow of funds to terrorists, while still 
maintaining a viable charitable footprint.   
A survey of the literature shows that the general solution seems to be increased 
collective international action, with an expanded understanding of the role of Islam in 
governance and charitable donations so as to minimize the negative effects on legitimate 
groups.  Yet, the literature shows that collective international action has experienced 
some seemingly insurmountable roadblocks.  Anne Clunan’s article titled “Collective 
Action Problems in the Fight against Terrorist Financing” suggests that the states will 
adopt varying approaches depending on how they define their interests.  “The U.S. seems 
to prefer the current patch-work approach of utilizing multiple international frameworks 
when it suits U.S. interests…while the Europeans’ interests are broader, seeking to create 
rule-of-law economics.”14  Clunan suggests that the cause of the collective action 
problem is the lack of a common definition of the problem posed by terrorist financing 
and non-state actors, leading to disjointed strategic options.   Prior to the attacks on 
September 11, 2001 national and international policy makers acknowledged the threat 
posed by terrorist organizations and as a result ratified anti-terrorist financing 
conventions.  The literature on the subject focused on the tracking of large sums of 
money traversing the traditional banking system.  These laws and conventions were 
implemented in an effort to halt the funds flowing to terrorist organizations either through 
state-sponsorship or otherwise.15  Most of the accepted knowledge involved state-
sponsorship of terror and the laws in place resulted in sanctions on those countries 
identified as financial sponsors of terror.  “Efforts to curtail the flow of funds to 
terrorists…took different approaches: pressuring states to curb their support for terrorism 
versus ensuring that states had the domestic capacity and incentives to suppress 
transnational criminal networks.”16  In addition, the mechanisms in place to track and 
identify terror financing were drawn from anti-money laundering efforts previously used 
                                                 
13   Ruehsen, “Arab Government Response to the Threat of Terrorist Financing,” 12. 
14  Anne L. Clunan, “Collective Action Problems in the Fight against Terrorist Financing” (Political 
Science Quarterly, 17, draft article submitted April 2006). 
15  Ibid., 10. 
16  Clunan, “Collective Action Problems in the Fight against Terrorist Financing,” 7. 
7 
to track criminal organizations.  UNSC Resolution 1333 shifted the focus from state-
sponsorship of terrorism to the financing of terrorism through transnational criminal 
organizations.17  Yet, the monograph from the 9/11 Commission asserted that, “Before 
9/11 the limited U.S. and UN efforts to freeze assets of and block transactions with Bin 
Laden were generally ineffective.”18   
After the attacks on September 11, the U.S. and international community took 
swift action to try and freeze assets of suspected terrorists.  “The United States engaged 
in a highly visible series of freezes of suspected terrorist assets after 9/11.”19  Yet, the 
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon did not change the methods by 
which domestic and international regulations continued to focus on anti-money 
laundering efforts.  They merely expanded to include non-state sponsors of terror.  
Knowledge on the financing of terrorism has expanded, but the literature shows that the 
policies have not evolved along with the knowledge gained.  “The 2000 UN Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime required member states to enact comprehensive 
domestic banking laws and regulations to deter and detect money laundering.”20  Tighter 
formal banking controls were implemented domestically and a number of countries 
agreed to tighten their own control on the banking industry to increase transparency in 
large transactions.  Very little past the seize-and-freeze efforts have been enacted 
regarding charitable donations.   
Ironically, although international collective action regarding banking regimes is 
starting to take shape, collective action regarding charities has fallen behind.  Collective 
action is hampered by the tension that exists between the Western style of 
governance/regulations and the role of Islam in Arab governments as suggested by J. 
Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins in their book Alms for Jihad.21  They explored the 
major approaches that the international community have taken with regard to Islamic 
                                                 
17  Clunan, “Collective Action Problems in the Fight against Terrorist Financing,” 10.  
18  John Roth, Douglas Greenburg and Serena Wille, Monograph on Terrorist Financing: Staff Report 
to the Commission (Washington D.C.: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 
[2004]), 12, http://www.9-11commission.gov/staff_statement/index.htm (accessed 13 March 2006). 
19  Ibid., 14. 
20  Clunan, “Collective Action Problems in the Fight against Terrorist Financing,” 11. 
21  Burr and Collins, Alms for Jihad, 7. 
8 
charities, the influence of extremist ideology, and the ability of each regime to stem the 
flow of funds to terrorist organizations.  The book especially focuses on the tension 
between the Islamic duty of zakat and the transparency required to prevent the funds from 
flowing to terrorist organizations.  Many of the regulations in place owe their history to 
anti-money laundering regimes.  “While money laundering is concerned with laundering 
assets of illegal origin and bringing them back into legal economic circulation, charity-
based financing of terrorism is concerned with using legal assets for an illegal activity, 
namely terrorist attacks.”22  The regulations in place are incapable of preventing 
fundraising through charities, and unable to identify money funneled through charities 
until used for terrorist acts.  As a result, the only regulations in place to tackle the issue of 
fundraising through charities are black-listing, requirement of background checks on 
employees, and increased transparency into their finances.  These efforts pose issues for 
certain charities that neither have the funds to accomplish background checks nor the 
capacity.  Blacklisting charities runs the risk of indiscriminately affecting all charities 
through fear of its constituency base.23  Transparency of financial transactions is a viable 
solution but there is no international enforcement regime.  In addition, there are no 
common policies or regulations across the international community including “the scope 
of groups targeted and responses and penalties.”24 
C.   FRAMING ATF POLICY AND ISLAMIC CHARITY DISCONNECTS 
AND THESIS ROADMAP  
Although finding and stopping funds from flowing to terrorist organizations are 
important steps in the fight against terrorism, there are clear implications for charitable 
organizations.  This thesis will examine ATF regulatory guidelines, the function the 
Islamic charities serve in both Islamic and non-Islamic countries, and the role of charities 
in the spread of extremism.  Specifically, to capture the trade offs and disconnects, the 
following chapters will examine the lack of common policies or regulations across the 
international community; the common ground and differences between the West and 
Islamic countries on charity and the difference between charity and proselytizing 
activities; the emergence of Islamic charities involved in insurgent/freedom fighter 
                                                 
22  Looney, “The Mirage of Terrorist Financing: The Case of Islamic Charities,” 2. 
23  Burr and Collins, Alms for Jihad, 267. 
24  Looney, “The Mirage of Terrorist Financing: The Case of Islamic Charities,” 3. 
9 
activities; and, possible solutions which can be implemented by both governments and 
charities to exclude financing terrorism from legitimate activities.     
This thesis involves a comparative study that uses four factors related to 
regulating charities and uses them to examine the regulatory frameworks in place in the 
United States, Great Britain, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Russia.  These four factors are the 
degree of governmental oversight, transparency of financial transactions, limitations on 
types of donations, and penalties for noncompliance.  This thesis will argue that although 
there is some degree of effectiveness to the regulatory frameworks in place in each 
country, their effectiveness can be increased through collective action rather than separate 
approaches to the problem.  In addition, this thesis will argue that there are aspects of the 
regulatory frameworks that have drawbacks for charities in general and Islamic charities 
in particular that should be addressed and modified to mitigate them. 
These cases examined here were chosen due to their role in the financial and 
political world, and either as users or raisers of funds.  The U.S. was chosen as a leader in 
the financial world, the U.K. holds the same distinction, Russia in the past few years has 
passed laws regarding nonprofit organizations, Saudi Arabia has ties to many of the 
Islamic charities, and the Sudan housed and allowed Osama Bin Laden to operate and 
later shut him down. In addition, Sudan is facing a humanitarian crisis and NGOs are 
present in the country to mitigate the crisis.  The four elements of ATF policy studied 
were: degree of governmental oversight, transparency of financial transactions, 
limitations on types of donations, and penalties for noncompliance.  Public documents, 
articles in academic journals, and published books provided the basis for the research.  
Works by various academics and institutions in the field of terrorist financing were used 
to outline the development of current regulatory practices and the tension that exists 
between the regulations and Islamic charities.  Charitable giving will not be 
quantitatively measured since such data does not exist and as such much of the thesis will 
evaluate policy based on speculative data.  Yet, the tensions that exist and speculated 
effects from those policies are sufficient enough to offer conclusion and propose future 
areas of study.   
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Chapter II will focus on Islamic Charities.  Understanding the requirement for 
charitable giving in Islam, and the function that these organizations serve in Islamic 
countries provides a basis for examining governmental roles in regulating Islamic 
charities.  In addition, the chapter will show the role that Islamic charities have played in 
the spread of Islamic extremism as well as their less nefarious role within Islamic 
communities and their humanitarian efforts.    
Chapter III will change pace and focus on ATF policies and regulatory guidelines 
by comparing regulatory guidelines across five countries: United Sates, United Kingdom, 
Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Russia.  Specific regulatory factors previously mentioned are 
degree of governmental oversight, transparency of financial transactions, limitations on 
types of donations, and penalties for noncompliance.  The chapter will conclude with an 
analysis of the similarities and differences of the regulatory guidelines and their 
effectiveness on stemming the funds to terrorist organizations.   
Chapter IV will suggest a policy solution to mitigate the tension between the 
Islamic charities and ATF regulatory guidelines.  The policy options are based on the 
comparative analysis taking into consideration the aspects that aggravate the legitimate 
charitable sector.   
Chapter V concludes by providing a recap of ATF regulatory guidelines and the 
tension between Islamic charities and existing policies.  Finally, the thesis will conclude 






II. ISLAMIC CHARITIES 
A. IMPORTANCE OF CHARITABLE GIVING IN ISLAM 
Charitable giving throughout the world and across time has been used for 
sustainable society and personal satisfaction.  Yet, charitable giving has evolved 
differently in Islamic and non-Islamic societies.  The roots of charitable giving in Islam 
are steeped in tradition almost fourteen centuries long.  The majority of charitable giving 
in early Islamic societies was local in scope rather than national or international.  
Charitable institutions designed to manage charitable resources gradually expanded in 
size and capability. 
Many Islamic societies, particularly those of the Middle East and South 
Asia, benefited in pre-colonial and even colonial times from sophisticated 
charitable institutions that channeled and managed donated resources.  
These institutions played an immeasurably important role in delivering 
social services from education to health care, in sustaining centers of 
research and artistic creation, and in promoting an active civic life in the 
cities of these regions.25 
The three charitable institutions within Islam are waqf, sadaqa and zakat which is a 
religious obligation or pillar of Islam.  These charitable elements first used familial 
relationships and religious courts to manage the distribution of charitable donations.26  
Over time, Islamic charities were created to manage distribution of donations either given 
through mosques or as direct donations.  Due to government interference and control over 
charitable institutions, monitoring mechanisms have devolved into the opaque system 
that exists today.27  In general though, zakat, sadaqa and waqf are utilized to sustain 
communities economically, socially and politically.28   
In contrast, charitable giving for non-Islamic societies is in addition to rather than 
part of economic stability and development.  Although charitable giving has been a part 
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of other religious establishments, because non-Islamic societies tend towards secular 
forms of governance, they have adopted taxation as the basis for creation of and 
maintenance of functioning governments and societies.  “Charity is now equated with 
social work, social welfare and social justice.”29  Taxation on the other hand has been the 
source of government revenue which throughout history has experienced moments of 
popular support (American Civil War) and moments of avoidance where business people 
have viewed it as a burden rather than a tool of civil society and social justice.30  In either 
case, charities are an added benefit rather than the source of community revenue.  
Because of this charities hold a different level of importance in Islamic societies than 
non-Islamic societies.   
1. Waqf, Sadaqa & Zakat 
Waqf (p. awqaf) is the charitable institution that manages the transfer or 
bequeathing of real property either to a community or family for charitable reasons or for 
“preserving family wealth.”31  
The long history of the waqf, fourteen centuries after the death of the 
Prophet, and the permanent nature and management of the institution has 
resulted in the accumulation of a huge amount of property throughout the 
Muslim world devoted to religious and philanthropic purposes.  In the 
nineteenth century waqf represented one-quarter of all the land under 
cultivation in Egypt and about one-third in Turkey.  Historically, the most 
frequent purpose of a waqf was for mosques, their construction, 
maintenance, and personnel.32   
The waqf is drafted into a legal document, similar to a will, and is managed by a trustee 
under the jurisdiction of the courts (religious).  Within the document, donors designate 
the disposition of the assets given in charity.  Communities would thrive or degrade 
under the waqf system.  “Since awqaf property could not in theory be sold, under-utilized 
or mismanaged waqf properties could fall into disuse and ruin, damaging the urban space 
of which they were a part and undermining the financial stability of the social services 
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that depended on them.”33  While waqf has had a rich history in charitable giving, the 
most recent waqf institutions have no resemblance to its predecessors.  “Although some 
countries have recently sought to revive the customary waqf by new laws to recover 
former waqf properties confiscated by the state and to encourage individuals to create 
new awqaf, the dislocation of waqf management and the creation of large sums now 
distributed to porous charitable organizations has seriously diluted if not destroyed the 
principle of performance in favor of grants to agencies whose lax accountability any 
older, traditional waqf donor would denounce with scorn.”34  In this sense, waqf 
institutions have lost their prestige and transparency. 
Sadaqa, although not a charitable institution, is the term used to describe the 
“voluntary and spontaneous giving by individuals.”35  Sadaqa is given as a confirmation 
of good fortune and piety and is given without strings or requirements.  It is not tied to a 
certain percentage of income and is given as private direct donations to a charitable 
institution.  This form of Islamic charitable giving is the majority of the funds generated 
in Western Muslim communities.   
In Canada and the USA where the tithe, regardless of whether it be 
Christian or Muslim, is regarded as a tax rather than a benefice…was 
preferred to the institutionalized almsgiving.  Private donations of sadaqa 
provided an essential means by which mosques and their outreach 
programs in support of Muslim communities were able to survive in North 
America.36 
While awqaf is an accepted and encouraged process for charitable disposition of property 
and zakat is regarded as a formal obligation under Islam, sadaqa is a voluntary gift from 
the “heart” rather than a required tithe.  “In many Muslim states where the administration 
and distribution of charitable donations were decentralized sadaqa rather than zakat 
became the principle source of Muslim charity.”37  
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Zakat is the required almsgiving for all able adult Muslims and has become one 
of the five pillars of Islam.38  Another explanation for zakat is that it is a devotional duty, 
one that should not be shirked or avoided.39  As such, “…zakat provides a constant flow 
of charitable resources from the broad membership of Islamic society.”40  Those with a 
certain income over a threshold amount must give a fixed percentage of their income to 
the poor.41  There is no specific form of payment and many zakat payments are given in 
cash and quite often are anonymous.  Throughout the Muslim world, there are and have 
been a variety of mechanisms to collect zakat.  In some communities, the ulema collect 
and distribute zakat.  In others, the sate collects zakat very similar to taxation in Western 
states.  But, predominantly zakat charitable institutions were created to try and manage 
the flow of zakat from Islamic communities.  Unlike sadaqa, zakat has specified 
recipients who can receive and benefit from zakat.  Those are: the poor; converts; 
wayfarers; those in bondage or in debt; newcomers to Islam; and, to facilitate and 
enhance Jihad.  Zakat has become an important component of the socio-economic 
infrastructure of emerging Muslim societies.  The charities that are used to collect and 
distribute zakat are the primary instrument in those societies.42  
B. EMERGENCE AND MANAGEMENT OF ORGANIZATIONS TO 
DISPERSE DONATIONS IN ISLAMIC SOCIETIES 
Management of charitable organizations has evolved from reliance on the local 
ulema (clerics), to community boards, to national state-led organizations, to international 
organizations to distribute zakat and other donations.   
Because individuals are free to give their zakat contributions as they think 
best, there is in effect a competition among various charities and donative 
institutions to attract zakat contributions from the Muslim community.  
This has led to the emergence of a variety of new models, although 
evidence for this is anecdotal rather than the result of in-depth study of 
zakat institutions.43 
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These charitable institutions use a variety of techniques to attract donations from creative 
advertising to appealing to causes that attract popular support.  “What starts out as a free 
gift from the public ends up as commodity in the marketplace of competitive 
humanitarianism.”44  As such, these charitable institutions take on a business life of their 
own.45  Although there is not one agreed upon definition of terrorism there is evidence 
that during the 20th Century the nature of terrorism has become more ideological and 
religious.46  With the changing nature of terrorism and its new ideological basis, popular 
support for their causes is inherently tied to the ideology proposed by the charitable 
organizations. And, charitable causes have evolved from helping the needy locally and 
creating local socio-economic infrastructure, to helping Muslim communities abroad 
affected by war, famine and natural disasters.  By expanding their (charities) scope of 
involvement, they increase the probability of being involved in legitimate and illegitimate 
causes.  And, due to their popularity and resourcefulness,  
Islamic charities through the Middle East and the rest of the world have a 
consistent source of funding from religious Muslims.  Although the vast 
majority of charities are legitimate enterprises, funding community 
development in Islamic communities, a number also have close ties to 
terrorist groups.  Additionally, a number of terrorist organizations, such as 
Hamas and Hezbollah, include charity and nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) as an overt part of their organizational structure, which raises 
questions of whether charitable funds are channeled to charitable purposes 
or terrorism.47  
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1. Humanitarian versus Terrorist Causes 
Distinguishing between humanitarian and terrorist causes can be difficult and 
many times both purposes coexist in one organization.  This does not necessarily 
implicate these charities with terrorist organizations.  There are thousands of charities 
that receive significant amounts of money and assets for legitimate humanitarian and 
religious purposes.48  Yet, charities continue to fall under scrutiny for supporting violent 
causes and terrorist organizations.  It is important to distinguish between legitimate and 
illegitimate charitable purposes to be able to create mechanisms to track and monitor 
them and ultimately stem the flow to violent organizations.  Traditionally, Islamic 
charities were used to distribute zakat, build mosques, establish religious education, and 
create health care institutions.49  Yet, some charities support both humanitarian and 
political causes and some are purely a front for terrorist organizations.50  This has not 
always been the case.  Research has shown that charities have evolved to support terrorist 
causes in the past twenty to thirty years.  Prior to this timeframe, charities in general and 
specifically Islamic charities primarily supported local and international sustainable 
development and disaster relief projects.    
As previously mentioned the ideological aspects of religious terrorism have a 
popular support base throughout the world and is perpetuated by charities through their 
programs and projects in developing states.  These charities owe their beginnings to 
Islamic states such as Saudi Arabia that created and used the charities not only for 
humanitarian assistance but to further their ideology and cement their influence in 
developing societies.  In addition, these charities have gained support in Western Islamic 
communities that seek to support humanitarian causes, and have few options to choose 
from.   Although this will be covered later in this chapter, it is important to note with 
respect to terrorist causes that states play a role in supporting ideologies that evolve into 
extremist causes supported by charitable organizations.  States do not do this in a 
conspiracy theory-type plot, but rather in an effort to combat foreign influence on Islamic 
societies.  “Saudi influence has been pervasive in creating schools, curricula, and  
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textbooks influenced by the teachings of Shaykh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-
1792) that instruct Muslims to return to the fundamentals of Islam as preached by the 
Prophet Muhammad.”51 
Much of the knowledge regarding the difference in humanitarian and terrorist 
financing structure in charitable organizations has stemmed from research regarding Al 
Qaeda’s financing network.  Scholars who have studied the roots of contemporary Al 
Qaeda financing have discovered that their financing network, “…can be directly traced 
back to the lessons learned by Arab-Afghan fighters during the early days of the Soviet-
Afghan jihad nearly two decades ago.”52  Research shows that by the mid-1980s, 
Afghanistan had been overrun with Islamist agencies including at least thirteen Islamic 
charities, to assist the Afghan fighters in fighting against the Soviets.53  These charities 
provided blankets and food to the fighters and assistance to refugee populations.54  At the 
height of the Afghan war, Pakistan welcomed a large amount of Islamic charities, but has 
since expelled many who have supported revolutionary organizations.  Yet real interest in 
the complicity of these charities was not taken until these charities upset the political 
balance of states that they operate in.  For Pakistan, “…it was not until the government 
was faced with growing internal violence and President Pervez Musharraf narrowly 
escaped several attempts to assassinate him that the Pakistan National Economic Council 
announced in January 2004 a $100 million program to administer the religious school 
curriculum and reform some 8,000 madrassas.”55  Regardless, charities who support both 
humanitarian and terrorist or violent opposition causes quite often find fertile ground in 
developing societies because they are capable of providing “public goods” that states 
either cannot or will not provide.56 
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2.  Role of Wahhabism and Salafism in Proliferation of Islamic Ideas 
Although extremism is not solely attributed to Wahhabism, Wahhabism has been 
implicated in spreading extremist ideology and many Islamic charities have their basis in 
Wahhabi thinking and backing.  A good working definition of Wahhabism comes from 
Hamid Algar, who admits that those who follow the teachings of ibn Abd al-Wahhab 
may not agree with his depiction of Wahhabism.  However, Algar’s definition of 
Wahhabism will be used for the purposes of this thesis.  He defines Wahhabism as a 
movement designed to do away the structures of law, theology, mysticism, and religious 
practices and find a way back to the original sources of Islam.57  The followers of al-
Wahhab found support among the Saud tribe and cemented their influence through the 
Saudi family which has ruled over Saudi Arabia since the 1920’s.   
Salafism is similar to Wahhabism.  Yet, “Two important and interrelated features 
have served to distinguish the Salafis from the Wahhabis: a reliance on attempts at 
persuasion rather than coercion in order to rally other Muslims to their cause; and an 
informed awareness of the political and socio-economic crises confronting the Muslim 
world.”58    While Wahhabism goes hand-in-hand with the Saudi state and as such the 
Saudi’s propagate Wahhabi thinking, Salafis are not connected with a particular state but 
rather groups of people committed to socio-economic and Muslim reform.  They first 
commingled in the 60’s when Salafis traveled to Saudi Arabia with the emergence of oil 
and the need for foreign labor.59  In either case, both advocate a pure form of Islam and 
condemn any other form of Islam.  Organizations imbued with Salafi and Wahhabi 
thinking were formed to further propagate the ideologies.  Some examples of these 
organizations who are also involved in charitable giving throughout the world are the 
Muslim World League (MWL) and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY).   
Scholars tend to disagree on which “ism” influences extremist thinking in Islam.  
According to the Testimony given by Mr. Alex Alexiev, a distinguished fellow at the 
Center for Security Policy, at the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology 
and Homeland Security on June 26th, 2003, “The Wahhabis continue to believe and 
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preach violence and Jihad as a pillar of Islamic virtue, rigid conformism of religious 
practice, institutionalized oppression of women, wholesale rejection of modernity, 
secularism and democracy as antithetical to Islam and militant proselytism.”60  They do 
this not only within Saudi Arabia but also in other communities worldwide through the 
mosques and educational institutions that they build as part of the zakat collected from 
Muslims.   
Although some scholars have attributed extremism to Wahhabism, there is 
evidence that Salafism is at the heart of the current extremist thinking.  According to 
Sherifa Zuhur, a Research Professor for the Strategic Studies Institute, “Wahhabism 
usefully served as a philosophy and mobilizing means for the alliance of the House of 
Sa’ud and the House of Shaykh to define a state.”61 While Wahhabism started out as an 
extremist ideology, over the years it has become more moderate due to the tempering 
relationship with the Saudi family.62  In contrast, the influence of the Salafi movement in 
Saudi Arabia arose as an opposition movement interested in challenging the status quo.  
In fact, “Usama bin Laden is emblematic of the cross-currents of salafist politics that 
emerged in years 1979 and 1980.”63  Because extremism has been attributed to 
Wahhabism rather than Salafism, Saudi Arabia, who has a symbiotic relationship with 
Wahhabi-trained clerics find it difficult to modify their support of Islamic charities that 
propagate this ideology.  If on the other hand Salafism is at the heart of extremist 
ideology and Islamic charities are actually falling prey to this influence, then Muslim 
states who want to suppress this opposition movement may find themselves more 
interested in regulating these charities.  But, whether extremism is tied to Wahhabism, 
Salafism, or a hybrid of the two, the fact that charities are involved is unarguable.  
Islamic charities are the tools utilized to collect funds, build mosques and schools, and 
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provide educators and educational materials to spread the ideology.  While these are not 
violent actions, they advocate an ideology intolerant of other ideologies.   
a. Madrassas (Religious Schools) 
One example of the spread and influence of extremist ideologies are the 
few madrassas (madrasahs) or religious schools that teach violence as a part of their 
curriculum.  As previously mentioned, many Islamic charities are involved in creating 
and funding madrassas or religious schools in developing societies where state provided 
education either does not exist or is out of reach of the lower middle class and poor 
populations.  “The reasons for the huge growth in the number of madrassas dates back to 
1979, when the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan led to large amounts of money 
flowing into Pakistan from the West and countries in the Gulf.”64  These schools are non-
secular and offer limited subject material mostly focusing on religious education.65  And, 
while these schools did not exist in early Islam, they have become the predominant 
Islamic education in places like Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, India, and Bosnia.  Since 
9/11 madrassas have been criticized as creators of future terrorists.66  The majority of the 
negative attention has centered on the madrassas in Pakistan; thus, much of this 
discussion will focus on those, but many of the same arguments transcend location.   
There is disagreement on the effects of a madrassa-type education on the 
youth of developing societies.  Some journalists, scholars and terrorist experts believe 
that the type of anti-western education given in madrassas directly influence the creation 
of future terrorists.  “These criticisms have focused on the few dozen Pakistani 
madrasahs that served as de facto training grounds for jihadists fighting the soviet 
occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980’s.”67  Others believe that only the combination of 
madrassas, relative poverty, and political authoritarianism creates future terrorists.  
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When the Pakistan economy was so dismal that madrassa graduates joined 
terrorist groups because no jobs were available, it was easy – but wrong – 
to conclude that the madrassas were responsible for nurturing terrorists.  
A country’s military, foreign powers, war lords, and the local economy all 
play major roles in the growth of jihadism – certainly more significant 
roles than the religious-based schools.68 
Although in depth research on madrassas does not exist, a few conclusions can be made 
from the presence of madrassas in developing societies based on anecdotal experiences 
by some scholars and analysts.   
• The first is that madrassas provide an opportunity for poor children who 
would otherwise not become literate.  “For young village kids, it may be 
their only path to literacy and for many orphans and the rural poor, 
madrasahs provide essential social services.”69  
• The second is that although the primary training is religious in nature, it 
does not necessarily mean that the curriculum is militant.  According to an 
interview with Vali Nasr, only a few madrasahs teach violence and hatred, 
although they are extremely conservative without offering expanded 
curriculums and altering viewpoints.70 
• The third is that since the madrassas teach a limited almost exclusively 
religious curriculum, that the knowledge gained by the students is skewed 
in favor of the views and ideologies of the teacher. 
Based on the conclusions drawn above, government policies intent on 
punishing the charities that support the madrassas, assuming that all madrassas create 
terrorists, could create more problems.  Marc Sageman, a forensic psychiatrist and former 
foreign service officer, has done extensive research on Al Qaeda’s terror network and 
published his findings in his book Understanding Terror Networks.  Based on his 
empirical information of the education levels of the terrorists in the Al Qaeda network, 
more than 50% were trained in secular schools, with only 23 of the 137 terrorists 
receiving religious training.  In addition, more than half were from the upper and middle 
classes and over 60 percent received at least some college education.  “The data refutes 
the notion that global Salafi terrorism comes from madrassa brainwashing, with the 
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exception of the Indonesian network.”71  Alexander Evans, who works for the British 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, published his analysis in Foreign Affairs Magazine.  
He stated that it is important for policy makers to encourage internal debate rather than 
demanding changes from above, while containing the outlier extremist madrassas by 
prosecuting them.72  Demonizing madrassas just as demonizing Islamic charities will not 
solve or reduce terrorism.  While both can be a tool for spreading extremist ideology, 
they both also have the capacity for spreading development.   
C. ROLE OF ISLAMIC CHARITIES IN ISLAMIC AND NON-ISLAMIC 
STATES 
The beginning of this chapter explained the basis for charitable giving both in 
Islamic and non-Islamic societies from their very inception.  In addition, it explained that 
Islamic charitable organizations were the instrument by which Muslims performed their 
religious duty by giving zakat, as well as waqf and sadaqa.  These charities are the 
mechanism used to foster sustainable development at home and abroad, they are 
responsible for building mosques, schools, healthcare centers, and administering to poor 
populations.  Yet, these charities also fulfill a much more strategic and important role for 
the states that sponsor them.  Not only are Islamic charities the tool used to collect and 
distribute zakat, waqf and sadaqa, but they also are used as strategic tools by 
governments who avoid overt action in a country facing humanitarian issues while still 
exerting developmental influence.  For instance, in developing societies previously 
known as the “Third World”, rather than engage the government on reforms which is the 
formal political process, NGOs have become the leading actors in development 
assistance.73  NGOs also act as leaders within states who do not have the capacity to 
provide for infrastructure to sustain communities within their borders.  In developed 
states such as Saudi Arabia, the state created and funded Islamic charities infused with 
Wahhabi ideology in an effort to compete with the Shi’a influence growing after the 
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Iranian Revolution.74  And, in western developed states such as the United States, the 
state saw the conservative Salafi infused Wahhabism more preferable to the spread of 
communism and funded Islamic charities along with Saudi Arabia.75  Thus, Islamic 
charities were funded in an effort to support the mujahideen in Pakistan and Afghanistan 
who fought the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.  Yet, the role of Islamic charities in 
Islamic and non-Islamic states should not be generalized.  Each state is different and as 
such Islamic charities and the role they fulfill is different.  As an example though, the 
differences will be explored by detailing their roles in Saudi Arabia (wealthy Islamic 
state), the United States (wealthy non-Islamic state), and Sudan (poor Islamic state in 
need of humanitarian assistance).  An example of a poor non-Islamic state will not be 
given because the Islamic charities do not hold a particularly important role in 
development in those societies.   
1. Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia, a country managed by a royal family in concert with Sunni clerics, 
saw the Iranian revolution under the aegis of Shi’ism as a threat.  The Shi’ite clerics in 
Saudi Arabia regarded the Iranian Revolution as a sign of the revival of Islam with a 
Shi’a bent.  In addition, Sunni wahhabists saw the Iranian revolution as a threat and tried 
to seize power away from the Saudi royal family and establish more extreme rule.76  The 
Saudi royal family in turn took steps to solidify their power base without falling prey to 
extremist ideology during the resurgence of Islam, and used the oil revenue to fund this 
effort.  “The principal means to accomplish the latter objective was to increase financial 
support for Saudi Islamic charities.”77  This expanded into funding Muslim communities 
in both Islamic and non-Islamic countries in an effort to spread the ideology and solidify 
Saudi power.  In Saudi Arabia the Islamic charities are inherently tied to the state.   
Yet, how and why Islamic charities began to emerge is not as important as 
understanding their present role.  As previously mentioned, Saudi charities are used as a 
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pseudo tax for the state.  “The fact that there is no Saudi income tax and Saudi Arabia is 
still a highly patriarchical, tribal, and clan oriented society, dependent on personal 
patronage and charity, makes Saudi Arabia a nation that places a heavy reliance on 
voluntary Islamic charity.”78  In this sense, the “tax” collected was funneled to groups of 
people who requested assistance either internal to Saudi Arabia or in other countries 
much like other states use tax money for foreign aid and assistance.  Yet, according to 
Anthony Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid, both researchers employed by the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, Saudi officials “…had far too little political 
sophistication to evaluate the groups asking for money.”79  In addition, Saudi officials 
delegated the technical aspects of money transfer to junior staff with little oversight and 
accountability requirements.   
In the past there were a number of government ministries that were involved 
either, “…directly or indirectly in charitable giving: the Ministries of Finance, Education, 
Foreign Affairs, Health, Higher Education, Information, Pilgrimage, and the Ministry of 
Islamic Endowments and Guidance Affairs.”80  Each ministry was led by a member of 
the Saudi royal family.  Since 2003 however, Saudi Arabia has established one agency to 
manage charitable giving within and outside of the country and even shutdown charitable 
giving outside of the country to try and get a handle on accountability.  “In June 2004, the 
Saudi government announced that the future activities of all Saudi charitable committees 
and organizations that send aid abroad will be monitored and directed by the Saudi 
Nongovernmental National Commission for Relief and Charity Work Abroad.”81  The 
effectiveness of this organization will be examined in the next chapter.  The important 
point to take away though is that Islamic charities hold an important role in the Saudi 
state government. 
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2. United States 
The emergence and role of Islamic charities in the United States was quite 
different than in Saudi Arabia.  The Islamic charities were not used as a form of taxation 
and were not entirely tied to governmental foreign aid.  Rather, their initial appearance in 
the U.S. was tied to the strategic alliance created by President Franklin Roosevelt and 
King Saud bin Abd al-Aziz al-Saud in 1945.  Prior to this meeting, there were very few 
mosques and very little opportunity for religious growth.  Islamic charities were used as 
the conduit for proselytization and as an avenue for Muslim Americans to give zakat and 
engage in other Islamic charitable giving.  Saudi Arabia provided the money and 
influence for expansion.  “In the USA and Canada an estimated eight percent of all 
Islamic establishments received some Saudi financial support for many years.”82 
Research shows that Islamic charities in the United States have formed an 
important support system for Muslim communities, and provided a conduit for charitable 
giving as well as political activism within the American political system.  For instance, it 
was noted that two major Muslim charities in North America have collected over 20 
million dollars in relief aid for earthquake victims in Pakistan.  Although this information 
was collected last year, the author estimated that the Muslim contribution would exceed 
the relief packages proposed by the U.S. government.83  And, in 2004 Muslim charities 
and non-profit political activist groups lobbied to allow time off during Ramadan for 
Muslim students in Brooklyn for the first time.  Similarly in Maryland, a court prohibited 
hearings on Muslim holidays.  And, Muslim voter registration has risen to 350,000 in the 
states of Florida, Michigan and Ohio and 1.2 million across 42 states.84   
3. Sudan 
In the Sudan, Islamic charities have been used to both alleviate underdevelopment 
and humanitarian crisis as well as proselytization of the population.  Since its  
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independence in 1956, Sudan has been a country plagued by ethnic conflict and 
humanitarian crisis.85  In addition, Sudan was a haven for Al Qaeda and Osama bin 
Laden.  According to Burr and Collins, 
In 1991 some 25 million Sudanese were represented by nineteen major 
ethnic groups and hundreds of smaller ones speaking some four hundred 
languages.  Arabic is the lingua franca in the urban enclaves, but English 
is often the preferred language of the elite.  Unfortunately, it was only too 
true that ‘religion in the Sudanese political context was no longer a matter 
of personal ethics, piety, spirituality or morality; but a lethal weapon in the 
power struggle’ between Arab North and African South.86 
Due to the Islamic influence in political matters, Islamic banking is the primary financial 
infrastructure.  In addition, the Islamic government exerts administrative control over the 
Islamic charities present within its territory.87  Charities in general and Islamic charities 
in particular, provide humanitarian assistance to a population in need of food, shelter and 
protection since Sudan as a state is incapable of providing sustainable development.  Yet, 
the lack of a strong state, Islamic banking system and the presence of outside 
organizations such as charities create an environment susceptible to nefarious 
organizations and money laundering activity.   
The Muslim World League, based out of Saudi Arabia, was the first Islamic 
charity to make a significant presence in Sudan.  Their mission was to proselytize the 
secular population.  Another Islamic influence came from the Islamic organization by the 
name of Islamic Call based out of Libya, intent on spreading the message of Islam.  Its 
headquarters moved to Khartoum in 1980, establishing a firm influence on Sudanese 
society.  “Not surprisingly, after Islamic Call moved to Sudan it initiated a determined 
proselytizing effort, especially in the southern Sudan among those practicing indigenous 
religions and Christianity.”88  There is evidence that these charities along with other  
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smaller organizations not only provided humanitarian and sustainable development 
initiatives, but they also provided assistance to Muslim revolutionary movements and 
terrorists.89 
Since the inception of these charitable organizations, they have been used by 
corrupt and predatory regional governments, been involved with radical Islamist groups, 
and lead the creation of madrassas.90  As previously discussed though, the presence of 
these organizations and the creation of madrassas are not necessarily a negative influence 
on the population.  Rather, they provide communities with an infrastructure that their 
state is unable or unwilling to provide.  The presence and role of Islamic charities in 
Sudan is not clear cut.  They work in concert with the state government and also at cross 
purposes depending on the affiliation of the charitable organization and its intentions 
within the country.  Telling the difference is difficult, and even harder to control. 
D. THE EFFECTS OF ATF POLICIES ON ISLAMIC CHARITIES 
Most of the analysis with regard to the effects of ATF policies on Islamic charities 
is speculative in nature since specific donor information does not currently exist.  There 
is evidence on overall donor confidence for foundation giving in the United States, but 
this does not extend outside of the United States nor does it drill down to Islamic 
charities.  Although the data is anecdotal, there is a consensus among leaders within 
Islamic charities and scholarly think tanks.  The only speculative survey of Islamic 
charitable giving was conducted by the Casey Foundation and documented in Laura 
Donohue’s article for the Michigan Journal of International Law titled “Anti-Terrorist 
Financing in the United Kingdom and the United States”.  The Foundation “…conducted 
a survey of 30 mosques and found that all of them had suffered a loss of funds…” due to 
fear of the federal government from their constituency base.91  
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A review of the literature shows that there is consensus among think tanks and 
charitable organizations that ATF domestic and international policies have caused a drop-
off in public support for Islamic charities.92  The direct and indirect result of those 
policies is as follows: 
• Closing of Islamic charities due to criminal investigations  
• Donor fear due to criminal investigations combined with little legal 
recourse once implicated 
• Reduced capacity for projects abroad for communities that need 
assistance.   
• Risk of charities gaining the perception of acting as tools of government 
rather than independent actors devoid of agenda.   
Although states will argue that all charitable giving is scrutinized, leaders within the 
Islamic charities and scholars who have studied the effects of ATF policies disagree.  
They feel that the policies unfairly target Islamic charities.  For instance, it has been 
noted that the charities that have been investigated and shutdown have been exclusively 
Muslim charities and that other businesses and charities that have dealings with restricted 
groups and states have not fallen under suspicion since they are not Muslim affiliated.93  
This runs the risk of not only negatively impacting a segment of society but also 
undermining the anti-terrorism effort by alienating Islam rather than working with 
Islamic groups to bring an end to violence.  According to John Esposito, an Islam expert 
at Georgetown University, “We run the risk of leaving a message that it’s not extremists 
we’re going after, but Islam.”94  In addition, Islamic communities overseas feel the brunt 
of these policies more so than other communities who continue to receive assistance by 
charities not targeted by ATF policies.   
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Much of the speculation on the effects of ATF policies on Islamic charities have 
been in regard to donor fear as a result of the seize, freeze and shutdown of certain 
charities within the United States and the pressure on other states to take action as well.  
Once a charitable organization is so designated, all of its materials and 
property may be frozen.  The charity is unable to see the government’s 
evidence and thus understand the basis for the charges.  And it has only 
limited right of appeal to the courts.  So the government can target a 
charity, seize its assets, shut it down, obtain indictments against its 
leaders, but then delay a trial almost indefinitely.95 
The fact that there is no legal recourse for these charities to defend their position or prove 
their innocence increases donor fear since donors as well as charity employees can fall 
under scrutiny.  According to an article posted in the Yemen Observer, “Post-September 
11, many Muslim charities say they operate in a climate of fear and suspicion that borders 
on persecution.”96  In addition, the article states that approximately 30 Islamic NGOs 
have been blacklisted as fronts for terrorist organizations.  Yet, although this article and 
others not cited here show that Islamic organizations have come under scrutiny Post 9/11, 
they do not depict the government’s case.  Even so, there is foundation to the fears based 
on the U.S. government’s track record with respect to blacklisted charities and those 
shutdown or frozen.  While lack of criminal convictions does not necessarily indicate 
innocence, it does show that the evidence collected was not sufficient to prove guilt.   
While some of the speculation regarding the effects of ATF policies on Muslim 
charities tends to be one-sided without empirical evidence, one report that does have 
credibility is the report produced by OMB watch, an independent watchdog organization.  
The report was compiled in response to the U.S. Treasury guidelines for charitable 
organizations and enumerated the top 10 concerns by Islamic charities in the United 
States.  The top 10 concerns are as follows:97 
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• Drastic sanctions in anti-terrorist financing laws are being used to shut 
down entire organizations, resulting in the loss of badly needed 
humanitarian assistance around the world and creating a climate of fear in 
the nonprofit sector 
• Despite sweeping post-9/11 investigative powers, authorities have failed 
to produce significant evidence of terror financing by U.S.-based charities. 
• Questionable evidence has been used to shut down the largest U.S.-based 
Muslim charities. 
• Anti-terrorist financing policies deny charities fundamental due process. 
• There are no safe harbor procedures to protect charities acting in good 
faith or to eliminate the risk of giving to Muslim charities or charitable 
programs working with Muslim populations. 
• Government action has created the perception of ethnic profiling and 
negatively impacted Muslim giving. 
• Organizations and individuals suspected of supporting terrorism are guilty 
until proven innocent. 
• Charitable funds have been withheld from people in need of assistance and 
diverted to help pay judgments in unrelated lawsuits, violating the 
intentions of innocent Muslim donors. 
• There is unequal enforcement of anti-terrorist financing laws. 
• Treatment of Muslim charities hurts, not helps, the war on terrorism 
The report details the civil rights concerns involved in the seizure of assets and closing of 
charities.  In addition, the report states that ATF investigations rely on secret evidence not 
available to the charities for their defense or explanation.  Finally the report concludes 
that the nature of the closures has caused a decline in donations especially during 
Ramadan.  Even those donations that do continue to come in have changed to cash 
anonymous donations which are virtually impossible to trace further hindering the 
governments ATF capabilities.98   
 Recent research accomplished by the Center on Philanthropy at Indiana 
University and published on Charity Navigator’s website shows that overall charitable 
giving has risen over the past year as compared to previous years.  Researchers conducted 
a survey of fundraisers, the current giving environment, and future giving expectations to 
produce a Philanthropic Giving Index (PGI).  Based on the survey data, they showed that 
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on a scale from 0 to 100 “…the overall PGI was 88.9, increasing from 86.3 in December 
2005 and up from 85.2 in Summer 2005.”99  The researchers attributed the increase of 
charitable giving on the rising economy, and better fundraising methods such as internet 
solicitations.  This statistical information is contrary to the arguments being made by 
Islamic charities.  While the research was conducted over a cross-section of the U.S. 
charitable sector, the numbers do not necessarily indicate higher giving in the Muslim 
charitable sector.  In fact, although donations collected for earthquake relief in Pakistan 
were projected to exceed 20 million dollars and are shown as a large figure out of U.S.-
based Islamic charities, the donation potential for Muslims in the U.S. is projected to be 
roughly one billion dollars.100  The reason given for not reaching the full giving power 
was fear from donor persecution from the government.101 
E. CONCLUSION 
Charitable giving in Islamic and non-Islamic states is important.  While charitable 
giving has different roots and implications in Islamic versus non-Islamic states, the 
protection of these institutions from nefarious groups is also important.  Yet, the 
regulatory frameworks have served to hinder charitable giving, causing the donor 
communities to fear prosecution and alienation.  The regulatory frameworks should work 
to protect and guard the apparatus that allows charitable giving, but in practice, the 
system offers little protection and even less understanding for the communities that 
support these charities.  The fight to stem the flow of terrorist financing is having the 
opposite affect on the communities that fear government action.  The ATF war has 
alienated the hearts and minds of the international Islamic communities and thus has 
created the opposite strategic affect (of creating communities that will support terrorist 
groups and causes).     
Based on the information discussed in this chapter, it seems that there are 
significant differences in state interests with regard to Islamic charities.  Due to the                                                  
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divergence in interests, it stands to reason that a blanket approach to charity regulation is 
not appropriate; however, collective action that takes into account the needs of the 
Muslim communities could produce positive results.  It seems that the overly inclusive 
regulatory regime alienated the Muslim communities both in the United States and 
elsewhere.  The ATF regulatory policies have negatively impacted the hearts and minds 
of the very communities that could have provided useful information in the overall fight 
against terrorism.  Yet, this assessment is premature.  A look at the ATF regulatory 
guidelines across five different states will examine their effectiveness in general and any 
implications for Islamic charities in particular before any conclusions can be drawn. 
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III. COMPARATIVE STUDY OF REGULATING CHARITIES 
ACROSS FIVE STATES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since Islamic charities are an important component of Islamic states as well as an 
important element of the charitable framework of non-Islamic states, and since ATF 
regulatory frameworks have negatively affected Islamic charities due to donor fear, there 
is value in examining the ATF regulatory frameworks to determine how or if they can be 
modified to minimize the negative consequences while still remaining effective.  While 
the regulatory frameworks evolve from legislation, and legislation stems from policy, 
sometimes the frameworks produce results that the policies did not intend.  Yet, 
sometimes the results are intentional to allow policy to rule the day; however, in general 
policies and strategies are generated in response to a perceived threat.102  Governments 
implement policy and create regulatory frameworks to produce an effective security 
environment.  Yet, the policies can produce negative unintended results for the strategic 
interests of a state.  For instance, in the United States an overly inclusive financial 
regulatory framework may stem the flow of funds to terrorists but it may also stem the 
flow for legitimate purposes and alienate a sector of society.  This outcome may in turn 
affect the hearts and minds and affect the political atmosphere and affect its overall 
strategic security goals.103    
Although there are few ATF regulatory frameworks that specifically deal with the 
non-profit sector, the nonprofit sector must operate through the formal and informal 
financial sector.  Since the nonprofit sector must use the financial sector, the financial 
regulatory frameworks can be used to analyze their effectiveness and the negative 
consequences to the nonprofit sector.  The ATF regulatory frameworks are divided into 
three categories: prohibition, detection/monitoring, and prosecution.104  Although some 
of the frameworks were constructed prior to the 9/11-attacks, that specific day in history 
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has influenced the regulatory environment that exists today.105  On that day, the United 
States was directly attacked on a large scale by an international terrorist organization with 
far reaching capabilities due to their financial network and system of supporters.  It was 
clear that although ATF regulatory frameworks were already in place in several 
countries, the regulatory frameworks were not far reaching enough and had not evolved 
sufficiently enough.106  The United Nations expanded the Resolutions already in place to 
encompass all terrorism rather than solely focusing on Al Qaeda and the Taliban.  The 
most significant change, which prompted the legislative actions in specific states, was 
UN Resolution 1373 which “…bound all of the member states to ‘prevent and suppress 
the financing of terrorist acts’, to implement the Financing of Terrorism Convention and 
to cooperate with other countries in this regard.”107   
The regulatory frameworks that are currently in place have taken different forms 
across states and regions.  The focus of the framework reflects the interests of the state 
and attempts to maximize effectiveness and minimize negative consequences.  While this 
chapter will not cover each states framework in depth, it will cover aspects of the 
framework which deal directly with charitable giving in an effort to determine whether 
the regulatory frameworks are appropriate to deal with terrorist financing through Islamic 
charities.  The end result of these frameworks should be to stem the flow of funds to 
terrorist organizations while protecting the mechanisms that allow charitable giving.  The 
following section will outline the selection of the cases and the aspects of the regulatory 
frameworks selected to capture the tension that exists.  Although international political 
economic principles are important drivers in why states choose to pursue certain 
economic and political actions, this chapter will not discuss the merits of one theory over 
another.  Rather, the chapter will accept the theories proposed by Robert Gilpin in his 
book Global Political Economy, that  “the nature of international affairs is anarchic” and 
that for the international economy to work, there needs to be a free flow of “goods, 
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services, people and capital across international boundaries.”108  Although the 
international political economy thrives on liberalism, regulatory frameworks bring some 
type of order to the anarchic political environment and states act in their own interests for 
security.109   
1. Case Selection 
This chapter will compare the ATF regulatory frameworks across five states in an 
effort to examine their effectiveness in stemming the flow of money to terrorist 
organizations through Islamic charities.  The states selected for the study were the United 
States, Great Britain, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan.  The cases were selected due to 
their relative importance in the financial and political world as well as their strategic role 
in the fight against terrorist financing.  The United States and Great Britain have 
historically held an important role in regulating financial markets; have been leaders in 
establishing financial mechanisms, and have pushed for international financial norms.  In 
addition, as the primary target of the 9/11-attacks, the United States has pressured the 
international community to implement added regulatory financial mechanisms.  Russia, 
who has a large Muslim population and has had political problems with the Chechen 
population, has recently enacted financial regulatory frameworks in an effort to monitor 
charitable giving both in domestic and international organizations.  In addition, Russia 
has recently been taken off of the list of uncooperative states and has agreed to join in the 
international effort to stem the flow of funds to terrorist organizations.  Saudi Arabia was 
selected as a case since the majority of Islamic charities either were created by the Saudi 
state, or are sponsored by Saudi citizens.  Finally, Sudan harbored Osama bin Laden and 
was on the list of uncooperative states.  In addition, Sudan is currently dealing with a 
humanitarian crisis with numerous charities and radicalized groups present in the country 
either helping with the situation, a cause of the situation or taking advantage of the 
situation. 
2. Selection of Regulatory Factors 
While a direct comparison of states is not recommended since their structures and 
legal mechanisms are too different to render a direct comparison, a comparison of 
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regulatory factors is appropriate within each states legal structure to measure their 
effectiveness and ineffectiveness in stemming the flow of funds to terrorist organizations 
while studying the specific aspects of regulatory mechanisms that either directly or 
indirectly cause negative consequences for Islamic charities.  The first factor examined in 
this chapter is the degree of governmental oversight manifested through compliance with 
UN Resolutions and FATF guidelines.  In addition, the cases will be examined for 
additional internal legislation that is adopted as a result of international resolutions.  
Another factor is the transparency of financial transactions made possible through 
monitoring and reporting requirements internal to each case.  The third factor is penalty 
for noncompliance either manifested through arrests and convictions or through 
investigations.  Some of the cases will only have a vague reference to investigations and 
assets frozen, while others have actual numbers for arrests and convictions.  Because a 
quantitative comparison is not possible, the analysis will weigh a state’s intent for 
implementation by comparing past actions to current track record.  Finally, the fourth 
factor is an examination of the environment that either limits or does not limit donations 
to charitable organizations and the methods employed to monitor donations and donors. 
B. COMPARATIVE ANALYISIS OF CASES: SIMILARITIES, 
DIFFERENCES AND CAPABILITY FOR CROSS APPLICATION 
The following discussion of the cases and comparison of the regulatory 
frameworks will first be described separately and then assembled into a matrix to show 
similarities, differences and to attempt to show areas for change or improvement.  The 
separate discussions will also briefly discuss their success in tackling terrorist financing 
through charities.  While it is important to note the success of the frameworks in terms of 
implementation, some of the success is not measurable since deterrence is a component 
of each framework which can only be speculated on rather than qualitatively analyzed.   
1. United States 
The United States’ regulatory framework is complex, with a number of agencies 
at both the state and national level taking part in monitoring, investigating, and 
prosecuting violations.  While the regulatory framework creates a mechanism, the 
American legal system provides the teeth.  The legal system focuses on prevention 
through laws that designate people and groups of people as terrorists and make it illegal 
to deal with them when the relationship proves to be in “preparation for, or in carrying 
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out” terrorist acts.110  As a result, investigations entail monitoring the interaction between 
entities to discover fault yet becomes difficult when the people and organizations under 
surveillance have both legitimate and illegitimate purposes.  “It is not uncommon for 
organizations suspected of sponsoring terrorist acts to have official purposes that 
encompass poverty relief and peaceful political engagements.”111  The following 
breakdown of the regulatory framework will give a clearer picture of how the regulatory 
framework is applied within the United States, and discusses the successes and failures in 
the system. 
a. Degree of Governmental Oversight   
The U.S. regulatory framework is designed around a combination of 
governmental oversight and self-monitoring requirements.  While governmental 
oversight is a key component of the framework, the structure of the framework impedes 
the ability for the government to provide the necessary oversight to monitor the system.  
The framework post-9/11 was fashioned in accordance with previous money-laundering 
regimes.  The two most important legislations that impacted the regulatory framework 
were the USA Patriot Act and the expanded powers under the IEEPA.112  The U.S. in 
coordination with the UK and the UN has pushed for implementation of a coordinated 
international framework.  The UN Resolutions have resulted in the designation of people 
and groups as terrorist organizations.  The United States has designated terrorist 
organizations and created their own lists that are used in various ways.  The lists prohibit 
financial dealings with these groups, and are used as flags for investigations.  The 
problem with the lists is that there are approximately six lists that the United States uses.  
While, Steve Kiser in his doctoral dissertation defends the lists because they have become 
more useful since they encompass not only names but also aliases, they are difficult to 
use and difficult to access for groups who want to avoid financial transactions with 
designated people and organizations.113  In fact, according to Laura Donohue in her 
article titled “Anti-Terrorist Financing in the United Kingdom and the United States” the 
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cumbersome lists provide little assistance to allow the financial sector to use due 
diligence in checking transactions.  As a result the requirement for financial institutions 
to produce suspicious activity reports floods the system with thousands of reports that 
make it difficult for the government to sift through and provide useful oversight.114  
Although the ATF regulatory framework is designed to provide a high degree of 
governmental oversight, it results in an inefficient and costly system that does not provide 
significant oversight of the charitable sector. 
b. Transparency of Financial Transactions   
The financial structure of the United States in theory has a high degree of 
transparency.  First and foremost, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is charged with 
certifying tax exempt status for charitable organizations.115  In addition, each state within 
the union is required to monitor the non-profit sector and the financial transactions within 
their purview; however, the IRS system has allowed charities to be used as fronts for 
terrorist organizations.  In addition, the free-flow of funds between states and between 
countries made it difficult for monitoring agencies to follow suspicious activity once the 
funds left its jurisdiction.  The USA PATRIOT ACT expanded the scope of the ATF 
regulatory framework that requires reporting requirements not only for formal financial 
institutions but also for informal value transfer systems that many charities use to transfer 
funds to areas without a formal banking structure.116  U.S. laws require financial 
institutions to submit suspicious activity reports and have set up financial intelligence 
units to investigate suspicious activities.  Although the system should produce a high 
degree of transparency, the effectiveness of this factor is dependent on the lists mentioned 
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activity.  Since the monitoring apparatus is inefficient, this results in thousands of 
suspicious reports rather than strategically targeted suspicious reports as previously 
mentioned.117 
c. Penalty for Noncompliance  
The United States has frozen over $130 million worth of assets, shutdown 
five charities, conducted investigations on over 400 people, designated 41 charities 
worldwide of terrorism, and convicted 39 people of crimes associated with either terrorist 
financing or some other related crime.118  Conversely, the result of the investigations and 
asset seizures in connection with Islamic charities have not turned out as successful as the 
figures mentioned above suggest.  Although assets remain frozen and these charities 
remain out of operation, the convictions and deportations were on non-terrorism grounds, 
which either calls into question their terrorist links, or calls into question the capability of 
the legal system for proving support for terrorism through charities.  The Monograph 
submitted to the 9/11-Commission reported that the federal investigations into two 
Illinois-based charities resulted in a conviction for the leader of Benevolence 
International Foundation (BIF) and deportation for a Global Relief Foundation, Inc. 
(GRF) fundraiser.  The conviction and deportation though were justified on non-terrorism 
related charges, and the charities themselves were not charged.  However, their assets 
remain frozen, and their groups blacklisted with little recourse for altering this 
outcome.119  Another example is the Holy Land Foundation which is still out of 
operation, and is appealing the decision to freeze their assets and award monetary 
compensation from those funds to U.S. families of victims of terrorist attacks in 
Palestine.120   The “government’s loose standards” and zealous prosecutions/asset 
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seizures have led to a “drop in contributions to Islamic charities” and alienated Islamic 
communities which in turn hinders any voluntary assistance that these communities may 
offer to the government.121   
d. Restriction on Donations  
The final factor is the ability of people to give to causes of their choice 
without restriction or limitation.  Although the United States boasts an open system 
supported by the Constitution under Freedom of Speech and Expression, material support 
for terrorism is prohibited under U.S. code.  As a result, donors as well as fundraisers can 
be prosecuted, which places limitations and responsibilities on the donors to make sure 
that the causes that they support are not connected in any way with terrorism.  While no 
donors have been successfully convicted of material support for terrorism, the fear of 
prosecution puts psychological limits on donors.  “Many in the Muslim community fear 
that their donations might land them on a list of suspected terrorist sympathizers and 
supporters, even if they are completely unaware of any wrongdoing or if the charity 
comes under suspicion years later.”122  Since the United States does not limit donations 
in support of religious and/or political projects, the framework in theory allows for a 
certain amount of donor flexibility, but at the same time there are “…significant risks 
currently accompany any contribution to an Islamic charity or any dealing with Islamic or 
Arab businesses.”123  Logically, donors should be more aware of charities and what their 
money is used for, but in practical terms, it is almost impossible for donors to have full 
visibility into a charity’s projects and their personnel.   
Although the United States ATF regulatory framework is not entirely 
ineffective in designating target groups and in the investigation of suspected groups and 
individuals, there are drawbacks to the regulatory framework from the perspective of 
charities and donors.  The drawbacks appear to be the lack of an all-inclusive and readily 
accessible list of foreign terrorist organizations and blacklisted individuals, suspicious 
and “classified” evidentiary procedures, and vague policies with regard to due process 
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and the appeal process for blacklisted individuals.124  The Al Haramain case is an 
example of good interagency response along with international cooperative actions 
between the United States and Saudi Arabia in an effort to stem the flow of funds through 
Al Haramain to Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations formally designated both by 
the United States and the United Nations.125   Yet, Al Haramain is an isolated case that 
does not necessarily prove that the framework achieves the desired result.  In fact, a 
Department of Justice analysis of the ATF regulatory framework acknowledged that the 
framework is designed to be “overinclusive” in an effort to prevent terrorism.126  The 
intent behind the framework therefore is to be broad enough to catch terrorist financing 
and/or prevent terrorist financing by establishing donor culpability.  While this may work 
from a states perspective, a legal review of the costs and benefits show that “Legislation 
designed to counter the financing of terrorism threatens to impose significant costs upon 
legitimate economic (charitable) activities.”127   
2.  United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom (UK), similar to the United States, has a complex system for 
monitoring financial transactions.  In addition, the United Kingdom has transparent 
financial structures, and has instituted laws and policies to regulate the financial system 
to stem the flow of funds to terrorist organizations.  Yet, unlike the United States, the UK 
has established one agency whose sole purpose is to monitor the charitable sector.  In 
addition, the UK operates under the philosophy of legislating intent as well as action.  In 
this sense, the United Kingdom attempts to prevent even the intention of financing 
terrorism.128 
a.   Degree of Governmental Oversight 
Governmental oversight into the financial sector for the purpose of 
stemming the flow of funds not only to criminal organizations but also to terrorist 
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organizations took form long before the United States and took its cue from anti-money 
laundering regimes.  The recent initiatives that the United Kingdom has implemented 
such as the Terrorism Act 2000 where in conjunction with the United Nations 
Resolutions and in accordance with other international efforts to establish legislative 
provisions to combat terrorist financing.  The UK took proactive steps to establish 
legislation to build the framework for stemming the flow of funds to terrorist 
organizations.  The Act “forbids the financing of proscribed organizations.”129  
Subsequent Acts and reviews have expanded the terrorism legislation but the main 
financial aspects of the legislation were implemented with the 2000 Act.  The UK has 
established a list of terrorist organizations, and the EU and UN have also established lists 
of people and organizations who have been implicated with terrorism.130  The UK list, 
unlike the lists produced by the United States only name organizations and are produced 
by one agency and approved through Parliament.  There have been 40 groups, not 
including 14 groups from Northern Ireland, named as terrorist organizations as of 
October 2005.  The list is easy to use and easily accessible.  However, the lists do not 
guarantee that funds will not flow to terrorist organizations because it is the coordination 
among government agencies, and the implementation of policies that increase the 
effectiveness of the governmental tools.  “While the Charity Commission could monitor 
Islamic charities in the UK, the authorities had less success in keeping track of dubious 
individuals who took advantage of the ease with which Islamists from Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia, Pakistan, Kashmir, and India obtained political asylum in Britain.”131  One aspect 
of governmental oversight that has been lauded internationally as the most efficient and 
effective government agency in managing the non-profit sector is the Charity 
Commission.  Yet, although the commission has established a process to certify, monitor 
and audit the charitable sector, their ability to prevent funds from flowing to terrorist 
organizations is dependent on political will.132     
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b. Transparency of Financial Transactions 
The UK has a well established financial system.  The transparency is 
similar to the United States in that there are financial standards and requirements that are 
managed by the formal financial sector, regulated through legislation, and monitored by 
governmental agencies.  The primary focus of the legislation, which results in an increase 
in transparency of the system and minimizes criminal infiltration of the system, is on 
anti-money-laundering.   This focus goes hand-in-hand with the EU focus on money 
laundering.  Specifically, the UK and EU have implemented procedures to impose 
identification requirements and collection of information on sender and receiver for “wire 
transfers”.133  In addition, the UK now requires “…all British charities with incomes over 
10,000 pounds per annum …to submit its audited accounts to the (Charity) 
Commission.”134  Yet, like the problems faced in the U.S., the system in the UK is only 
as good as the ability for designated government agencies to handle massive amounts of 
information efficiently while minimizing the costs to the government as well as the 
financial sector.  FIUs have also been established and the UK and EU have established a 
forum to share intelligence gathered through financial as well as criminal investigations.  
The effectiveness of this group is as yet untested, but could prove to be a step in the right 
direction.   
c. Penalty for Noncompliance 
The penalty for noncompliance with the ATF regulatory framework is the 
seizure of assets, investigation, prosecution, conviction, deportation, and the closure of 
any charity within the UK’s jurisdiction.  According to the operational guidance 
publicized by the Charity Commission, “It is against the law to be a member of a 
proscribed organization and it is also illegal to assist, raise money for, or send money to 
one, or anyone who is a member of one.”135  As such, the UK has established a 
regulatory framework that is capable of regulating charities and creating a financial 
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environment that is safe from terrorist and/or criminal organizations.  Unfortunately, a 
good framework does not necessarily ensure the desired result.  In the case of the UK, 
“By 2004 the UK had frozen the assets of more than 100 organizations, mostly charities, 
and 200 individuals.”136  Yet, a survey of available information shows that only a few 
charities have been closed as a result of terrorist financing in the UK, and those that have 
been shutdown have been due to either pressure from or in reference to US 
investigations.  Another issue facing the enforcement of penalties is willingness to take 
definitive action.137  Until London was attacked by terrorists, the British seemed reluctant 
to enforce the regulatory framework, yet the attacks have changed the environment, and 
charities run the risk of similar “overinclusive” enforcement consequences as in the U.S.  
It is a catch-22, if the UK takes action, then they are “overinclusive”, but if they do not 
take action, they are not asserting their political will.  There does not seem to be a middle 
ground.  The danger in state action lies in how it is taken and whether there is any burden 
of proof on the states’ part.  According to Laura Donohue, the shift from “criminal to 
civil standards, divorcing financial forfeiture provisions from conviction of any 
underlying offense”   has expanded the government’s capability of seizure of assets 
without having to prove its case in a criminal court with the required evidentiary 
processes.138  Although there are few criminal investigations in the non-profit sector, 
assets have been seized and frozen through this new shift in policy which effectively 
impedes a charity’s capability to operate without proof of criminal behavior.  While these 
expanded governmental capabilities are touted as positive, this brings the state into 
“…conflict with well-established religious beliefs” and obligations further affecting the 
hearts and minds of the Muslim community.139 
d. Restriction on Donations 
Unlike the right of free speech and association in the U.S., the UK has 
placed restrictions on intentions and associations as well as actions.  As such, it is illegal 
to belong to or support an organization that has stated violent intentions whether or not 
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they have taken actions to that effect.140  This is damaging for charities that may have 
both legitimate and illegitimate purposes.  Although there are enough charities and 
groups to choose from and a few commingled groups can disappear with minimal impact 
to the receiver communities, the restriction on association limits the ability of Muslim 
communities to express them-self and offer non-violent opposition.  In addition, while 
intentions are difficult to prove, the threat of legal action against intentions may be 
enough to negatively affect legitimate charities for fear that they have been infiltrated by 
persons or groups of people affiliated with terrorist organizations.  Yet, unlike the U.S., 
there is no question about the legitimacy of a charitable organization if they pass the 
requisite screening and registration and yearly auditing process.  While, legislating 
intentions is difficult, when successful, it provides a safer charitable environment.  In this 
sense, the restrictions placed on intentions actually assist the legitimate charities.   
The UK ATF regulatory framework has a long history based on the 
government’s experience in fighting the war against terrorism in Northern Ireland.  In 
addition, the regulatory regime has taken its structure from previously established anti-
money laundering regimes which may not be as effective and appropriate in stemming 
the flow of funds to terrorist organizations through charities.  It has been noted that there 
are more hoops to go through in the normal course of financial transactions, but the end 
result is a flood of suspicious activity reports that prohibits the government from 
“ferreting out real threats.”141  Yet, the most important point to take away from the UK 
ATF regulatory framework for the purposes of this thesis is that the regulatory 
framework attempts to minimize negative affects to charitable donations through the 
work of the Charity Commission; however, Laura Donohue points out that although 
domestic efforts are important, an effective multilateral effort would gain dividends over 
the current separate and unequal state responses to ATF.  She states that, 
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…each state tends to view its regulatory system as preferable: the United 
Kingdom sees its Charity Commission as ‘superior to anything in 
America, where charities are overseen chiefly for tax purposes.’  In 
contrast, Americans brag that they are ‘light years ahead of the rest of the 
G7’ in regulating their financial sector.142   
3. Russia 
The regulatory framework in Russia is less evolved than in the U.S. and UK.  In 
addition, the charitable sector is much more “homegrown” with only a few international 
organizations active within its jurisdiction.143  This environment makes it simpler for 
governmental oversight and at the same time has different implications for Islamic 
charities.  Islamic charities are the predominant support for the refugee population as a 
result of the Chechen separatist movement.  In addition, Islamic charities support the 
large Muslim population that exists in Russia.  While other western states have a wide 
variety of practicing religions within their borders, according to the CIA fact book Russia 
only has three: Christian, Russian Orthodox, and Muslim.  Of the three, the second most 
prevalent religion is Islam.144  The regulatory framework must balance enforcement with 
the risk of alienating a significant portion of the population with unpopular and overly 
discriminatory policies.   
a. Degree of Governmental Oversight 
Although Russia was initially on the FATF list of non-cooperative states, 
it has since taken an active role in implementing anti-money laundering legislation to 
regulate its financial sector.145  In addition, Russia has created its own list of blacklisted 
organizations.  Considering that Russia’s efforts are still in its early stages, the degree of 
governmental oversight is similar to the U.S. and UK.  One point of divergence though 
has to do with Russia’s formula for determining jurisdiction for blacklisted organization.  
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According to commentary from the International Relations and Security Network, 
“Russia’s newly unveiled terrorism blacklist only includes groups that pose a direct threat 
to Russia.”146  Since much of the terrorism that Russia faces is homegrown or Islamist in 
nature, its focus is understandable.  Yet, the regional and domestic focus of their blacklist 
could pose problems if and/or when Russia requires Western assistance with their ATF 
efforts.147  The international trend is to start consolidating lists and efforts to stem the 
flow of funds to terrorist organizations.  In addition, the new Russian legislation will 
increase government oversight of charities.  The bill seeks to control the presence of 
foreign NGOs “…and restrict Russian organizations’ ability to accept foreign cash or 
employ non-Russian workers.”148  While critics of the bill are concerned that this is a 
move by the Russian government to control all aspects of civil society, this bill actually 
seeks to control foreign political influence that would protect its homegrown charitable 
organizations.149   
b. Transparency of Financial Transactions 
Russia’s tumultuous political history created an environment that upon the 
fall of the Soviet Union opened up a political and economic vacuum that criminal 
organizations took advantage of.  “As a result, the Financial Action Task Force on money 
laundering put Russia on the black list of tax havens in 2000.”150  Since then, Russia has 
taken steps to increase the transparency into the financial sector to stem the flow of funds 
primarily to criminal organizations but also to terrorist organizations.  According to the 
Russian banking industry in a consolidated commentary released in 2004, they will seek 
to take seven measures to comply with all legislation and secure legitimate funds.151  
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Although these measures impose significant operating costs to the financial sector, the 
terrorist and criminal problem is serious enough for the industry to absorb the cost.  
While transparency is essential in a states ability to monitor the sector, the states 
capability is only as good as the lists mentioned above as well as their will to impose 
penalties for noncompliance; however, since Russia experienced a large money 
laundering problem in the 1990s, any steps will negatively impact terrorist financing.  It 
is unclear how transparency in the Russian framework will affect Islamic charities since 
the measures are quite recent. 
c. Penalty for Noncompliance 
The penalty for noncompliance with anti-money laundering regulations 
and charitable financial regulations are seizure of assets and prohibition for the use of 
Russian financial markets.  In addition, any groups or people found noncompliant with 
the regulatory framework runs the risk of investigation, arrest and conviction through the 
Russian legal system.  While specific information regarding the implementation of 
penalties for noncompliance in conjunction with the ATF regulatory framework, there is 
publicly available information regarding terrorism-related convictions in general.  
According to the US Embassy in Moscow Russia country report there were “…28 
terrorism-related convictions and 50 pending terrorism trials in Russia.”152  The apparent 
extent of ATF regulatory enforcement in Russia is the black listing of organization and 
the prohibition of foreign financial transactions with Russian NGOs.  One analysis of the 
capability of the Russian government to enforce the regulatory regime states that, 
“Russia’s central government remains weak and often ineffective in ensuring compliance 
with Russian law.”153 While this analysis was conducted in 2003 and recent legislation 
indicates that the Russian government intends to take more direct enforcement of the 
ATF regulatory framework, further analysis and review in the future will be required to 
determine any negative effects on Islamic charities. 
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d. Restriction on Donations 
A number of the charities that operate in Russia have political purposes.  
The regulatory restrictions on the non-profit sector are intended to suppress the political 
competition that the charities pose with the Russian government.  A search of the groups 
that are present in Russia showed that the charities support Jihadist and Separatist 
movements within Russia.  The limitation on the ability to support such causes 
accomplishes two things, one intentional and one unintentional.  The first is it ensures the 
survival of the Russian government in its present state.  The second is it unintentionally 
alienates a large sector of the Russian population.  Due to the large amount of NGOs 
currently operating in Russia (450,000) with a number of them supporting Islamic causes 
and communities, the Russian government both fears the increasingly popular Jihadist 
movement and acknowledges the need to incorporate the Muslim communities rather 
than alienate them.  A balance in the application of policies that is required is not yet 
evident. 
4. Sudan 
In comparison to the other three cases discussed above, the anti-terrorist financing 
regulatory framework of Sudan is much less evolved and even less effective.  The 
Constitution and legislative framework has been suspended a number of times due to the 
long history of political instability.154  The regulatory framework is complicated even 
more by the existence of two different legal systems in North and South Sudan.  North 
Sudan operates off of Shari’a (Islamic) law.  Southern Sudan operates off of a more 
western legal system.155  In addition, the continuing humanitarian crisis guarantees the 
presence of foreign humanitarian organizations and the political situation is vulnerable to 
foreign influence.  Sudan has been listed as a safe haven for terrorism by the United 
States, although recently has been taken off the list of non-cooperative states.156 
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a. Degree of Governmental Oversight 
There is a low degree of governmental oversight in regard to the ATF 
regulatory framework because the framework is not fully formulated and implemented 
throughout Sudan.  Since the state vacillates between democratic ideals and authoritarian 
regime, the policies and regulatory frameworks will not fully evolve.  Sudan needs to 
achieve a level of stability to be able to create and implement a framework that is 
appropriate to the interests of the state.  Sudan has focused on “…ending the long-
standing civil war...” as an important step in the war on terrorism.157  While Sudan has 
pledged to take active steps in the international fight against terrorism, government 
corruption and civil war limit the chances of instituting an effective ATF regulatory 
framework.  Sudan has not established a list of blacklisted organizations, but accepts the 
UN lists to be able to operate in the international financial sector.  However, analysis on 
the use of those lists by the government and banking sector is not available. 
b. Transparency of Financial Transactions 
Sudan’s financial sector is not as transparent as the international 
community would like, but there are some controls present that are necessary in order to 
receive IMF and World Bank loans and assistance.158  According to the 2006 Index of 
Economic Freedom the “…majority of financial institutions adhere to Islamic financial 
principles…and there are 25 commercial banks in Sudan.”159  The presence of banks and 
financial institutions does not necessarily imply a high degree of financial sophistication.  
Yet, even though a majority of the Islamic financial transactions are cash-based, the 
Islamic banking institutions still attempt to adhere by ATF regulatory principles set forth 
by FATF and IMF/World Bank.  In fact, Sudan sent government officials to an IMF lad 
training conference that promoted “…adoption of harmonized terrorism financing 
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legislation…and assist the attending countries in the drafting of their laws.”160  The 
publicly accessible information regarding the transparency of the financial sector and 
anti-terrorist financing is scant.  The majority of the articles talk about Sudan’s intentions 
for implementing anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing regulations; 
however, there has not been an assessment of the success of the measures taken.  Another 
aspect hindering the full implementation of the international regimes is Sudan’s reliance 
on the need for an international definition of terrorism.  Sudan has advocated for an 
international agreement on the definition of terrorism for use in their domestic legislation 
and regulatory framework.161  Without this definition, they have argued that proper ATF 
efforts cannot be made to identify terrorist organizations.   
c. Penalty for Noncompliance 
Since information regarding the governmental oversight and financial 
sector transparency is not available, there is nothing written in regard to penalties for 
noncompliance with ATF regulations.  Other than the seizure of Osama bin Laden’s 
assets and his deportation along with his associates, there are no other accounts of 
government action.  In addition, the actions taken against bin Laden and his Al Qaeda 
associates were taken prior to the new ATF regulatory initiatives.  Since there are no 
formally documented penalties, charities face a different negative consequence.  They 
can fall prey to terrorist organizations, and/or they can be accused of terrorist financing 
and expelled from Sudan without legislative recourse. 
d. Restriction on Donations 
Sudanese citizens are afforded the right to freedom of speech and 
association.  These rights are similar to the United States but not applied equally, and 
non-citizens are not afforded these rights in the Constitution.  Regardless, these rights 
imply that the right to associate with and support groups is not limited; however, different 
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regions within Sudan may have different practical applications of this legislation.162  This 
discussion though has little relevance to support for Islamic charities, because the 
charities that are present within Sudan are foreign and are present in the country to 
alleviate the humanitarian crisis and foster sustainable development.  There is no publicly 
available information regarding the local charitable sector. 
In either case, with an opaque financial sector and un-assessed regulatory 
framework, terrorist organizations have the opportunity to thrive.  Any charities that 
operate in this environment run the risk of being implicated with a terrorist organization, 
yet the humanitarian crisis and armed political struggle make it very difficult for charities 
to stay away.  In fact, the Sudanese population needs the assistance that charities can 
provide since the government is incapable of providing assistance to the large refugee 
populations and those injured and left homeless by civil strife.  Increased governmental 
oversight and banking standards can increase security for charities; however, the 
regulatory framework is too young to form a proper assessment. 
5.  Saudi Arabia 
The analysis on Saudi Arabia’s ATF regulatory framework was saved for last 
because a large majority of the Islamic charities have links to Saudi Arabia.  Along with 
this logic, a strong regulatory regime in Saudi Arabia would go a long way to securing 
the Islamic charitable sector.  The previous chapter discussed Saudi Arabia’s role in the 
creation of Islamic charities, and the charities’ importance within Islam.  In addition, the 
previous chapter briefly touched on the regulatory measures that Saudi Arabia has taken 
in an effort to regulate the charities and charitable donations.  The following is a more 
comprehensive analysis of that framework post-2003. 
a. Degree of Governmental Oversight 
Saudi Arabia has taken steps to implement anti-money laundering and 
counter-terrorism financing reforms after a FATF evaluation sited their failure to 
implement appropriate legislation.  The report, in addition to the 2003 Riyadh bombings 
was enough impetus to cause Saudi Arabia to take necessary steps to increase 
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government oversight into the financial sector.163  According to a study conducted by the 
Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, which conducted a 
comparative assessment of Saudi Arabia with other Islamic countries in their 
implementation of legislation and enforcement of ATF regulatory frameworks discovered 
that comparatively speaking, Saudi Arabia has established a strong legal framework and a  
moderate corresponding regulatory framework.164  Although Saudi Arabia has made the 
appropriate changes to the legislation and regulatory framework, Saudi Arabia has failed 
to regulate finances from the royal family which accounts for the majority of funds within 
Saudi Arabia and governmental oversight is only as good as the personnel in charge of 
the monitoring programs.165  As far as government oversight into the non-profit sector, 
Saudi Arabia has established one agency to oversee donations to Islamic charities.  This 
effort approaches the intent of the U.K.’s Charity Commission; however, since it was 
only created in 2004, its success has not been fully evaluated.  Although data on 
enforcement of the charity regulatory regime is only speculative, on paper charities are 
required to use one bank account; are restricted from cash transactions, and are heavily 
monitored for overseas transfers.166  Finally, similar to Sudan, Saudi Arabia has 
disagreed with the U.S. definition of terrorism and has advocated donations to groups 
such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization although the U.S. has listed them as a 
terrorist organization.  According to a CRS report, “…many Saudis identify strongly with 
the Palestinian people and view support for Palestinian causes as a religious, cultural, or, 
in some cases, political obligation.”167  Without an internationally agreed upon definition 
and list of terrorist organization that all states abide by, collective action is difficult if not 
impossible.  Currently states acknowledge the UN lists and also create their own as an 
added measure; however, since terrorist financing is a cross-border issue, cooperative 
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action is necessary to pursue the funds and prosecute the offenders.  Agreement on 
terrorist groups is an essential component of the international ATF effort. 
b. Transparency of Financial Transactions 
The Saudi banking system and due diligence requirements are fairly 
transparent.  The Saudi government has established banking standards and requirements 
that are comparable to western banking standards.  According to a report from the Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), “…the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia required all Saudi 
Commercial Banks to identify accounts in the names of all individuals and entities on the 
(UN) lists.”168  In addition, according to SAMA, Saudi Arabia has reformed banking 
rules that govern the “…opening of bank accounts and general operational guidelines…to 
further strengthen the implementation of ‘know your customer’ policies.”169  The 
independent study conducted at Brown University agreed with the report submitted by 
SAMA.  It states that Saudi Arabia, “…is one of only one of three (Arab-Islamic) 
countries that have taken steps to notify domestic banks of their obligations (under ATF 
regulations), to impose reporting requirements on banks, to extend these requirements to 
non-bank financial institutions, and to provide assistance to banks and financial 
institutions in implementing new legal and administrative measures.”170  Yet, not all 
experts agree that these measures operate across all spheres of Saudi society.  According 
to Moyara de Moraes Ruehsen, “One criticism that has been voiced repeatedly is that 
many wealthy financiers with alleged ties to terrorist finances, have close connections to 
the royal family, and are therefore immune from prosecution.”171  Although a transparent 
banking system has taken shape in Saudi Arabia, the wealthy Saudis that have ties to the 
royal family may escape penalties for any infractions in the financial sector. 
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c. Penalty for Noncompliance 
Saudi Arabia’s penalties for noncompliance are similar to the penalties in 
the U.S. and U.K.  According to SAMA, Saudi Arabia was one of the first countries to 
implement UN Resolutions 1267 and 1333 by freezing Osama bin Laden’s assets in 
1994, and to date has frozen “…42 accounts belonging to eight individuals and entities 
that total about US$5,403,404.92.”172  While this amount may seem significant, the 
international community has frozen more than $112 million in assets, which implies that 
these were token efforts to show cooperation rather than earnest efforts to stem the flow 
of funds to terrorists.173  In addition, SAMA states that the penalties for noncompliance 
include seizure of assets, severe financial fines, and could also include imprisonment.174  
Yet, there are no specific accounts of convictions, fines or people imprisoned for terrorist 
financing.  Without a proven track record of successful investigations and convictions, 
the success of the regulatory measures comes into question.  Conversely, all Islamic 
charities supported by Saudi Arabia run the risk of guilt by association due to Saudi 
Arabia’s selective enforcement of the regulatory regimes and subsequent penalties if 
implicated for terrorist financing. 
d. Restriction on Donations 
Saudi Arabia has not placed rights-based restrictions on the charitable 
sector as the U.S., UK and Russia have; however, there are restrictions on the Saudi 
population.  For instance, freedom of speech is limited to anything that educates or boosts 
“national unity” yet anything that causes political unrest is banned.175  These restrictions 
do not necessarily affect the charitable sector.  What have positively affected the 
charitable sector are the significant restrictions that the other states have not established.  
Cash-based donations to charities outside of the country are prohibited.176   In addition, 
there are significant restrictions on how charities operate through the formal financial 
                                                 
172  “A Report on Initiatives and Actions Taken by Saudi Arabia to Combat Terrorist Financing and 
Money Laundering,” 5. 
173  Burr and Collins, Alms for Jihad, 49. 
174  “A Report on Initiatives and Actions Taken by Saudi Arabia to Combat Terrorist Financing and 
Money Laundering,” 17. 
175  “Saudi Arabia: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices” (internet: U.S. Department of State, 
[2004]), 5, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27937.htm (accessed 3 November 2006). 
176  “A Report on Initiatives and Actions Taken by Saudi Arabia to Combat Terrorist Financing and 
Money Laundering,” 5. 
56 
sector.  These steps have helped Islamic charities increase their credibility and can only 
pay more positive dividends as long as the regulatory framework can be equally and 
consistently applied across all pockets of Saudi society. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
At the beginning of this comparative study, it was noted that each states’ interests 
mold the direction that the regulatory frameworks will take.  Most states seek to 
maximize their security first and foremost.  The 9/11-attacks had a significant impact on 
most states’ security outlook and resulted in over-inclusive policies in an effort to gain a 
foothold on security; however, not all states were quick to take action in the financial 
fight.  The previous discussion points out that Russia, Sudan, Saudi Arabia and even the 
U.K. were slower in certain respects to assist the U.S. on tracking terrorist finances, 
especially through Islamic charities.  Terrorist attacks within each state galvanized the 
governments to take proactive steps in the ATF fight.  Logically, states were not 
motivated to impose significant costs on their financial and private sectors since their 
immediate interests were not affected.  The attacks and subsequent government actions 
show that very few states are immune to terrorist attacks, and that the ATF regulatory 
regimes can only work with cooperative and consolidated international action.  Yet, not 
all states within the study were willing to be entirely cooperative and adopt an 
international outlook on the fight against terrorist financing.  In fact, most the states in the 
study adopted their own list of banned groups.  In addition, some of the states refused to 
take action against certain “terrorist” groups that the U.S. had designated because they 
did not agree that those groups fit into their own definition of terrorism.  Finally, 
although the penalties for noncompliance were similar across most states in the study, 
enforcement of those penalties were spotty, and depended on political will and the 
capability of their legal/investigatory framework to properly investigate and prosecute the 
groups in question.   
The following table illustrates the specific similarities and differences in the ATF 
regulatory frameworks.  The methodology used to construct the table was based off of the 
methodology used to construct the table in the comparative study conducted by the 
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Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University.177  While the Watson 
Institute measured the strength of a states ATF regulatory regime according to how far 
they have gone “beyond the United Nations’ list of individuals or groups associated with 
the use of terrorism,” the following analysis acknowledges these efforts and goes a step 
further by assigning significance to the effectiveness of the measures.178  Effectiveness 
was based on the information gathered in the previous sections of this chapter.  An 
explanation of the analysis follows the table below.   
 
Relative degree of compliance and implementation 
































Table 2.   Comparative Assessment of States’ ATF Regulatory Framework 
 
The United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia received the strongest marks for 
governmental oversight due to the presence of one agency whose sole purpose is to 
regulate the charitable sector and specifically monitor these organizations.  While the 
United States has several agencies whose role it is to monitor the charitable sector, its 
effectiveness is minimized by the lack of specific focus on the charitable sector.  Russia 
is not as strong in government oversight as the UK and Saudi Arabia since it has not 
designated a specific agency to monitor charities and its ATF regime is so new.  Finally, 
Sudan is the weakest of the cases since its central government is weak and incapable of 
fully implementing any regulatory framework regardless of their intentions.   
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The UK and U.S. were strongest in the transparency of the financial sector.  Their 
strengths were due to the implementation of strong financial standards and equal 
enforcement of financial regulatory regimes; however, although they were the strongest 
in the study, one area that experts have noted is a drawback of the U.S. and UK ATF 
efforts is their reliance on anti-money laundering standards.179  The U.S. and UK could 
increase their ATF efforts even more by reevaluating the link between government 
oversight and financial transparency with regard to money-laundering regimes that do not 
result in effective ATF efforts.  Russia and Saudi Arabia do not have as transparent a 
financial sector, yet they have made an effort to implement and criminalize money-
laundering and terrorist financing.  Finally, Sudan has taken steps to secure their financial 
sector in an effort to fuel development; however, these efforts have not specifically 
focused on anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing yet and are not mature 
enough to evaluate their effectiveness, hence the lowest rating.   
The two most important factors affecting Islamic charities are the last two.  The 
United States received the strongest rating for penalty for noncompliance because of the 
active efforts taken to seize assets, close suspected charities and prosecute those involved.  
Although the U.S. was given a high rating for these measures, the outcome of 
investigations and prosecutorial actions do not necessarily yield the desired results.  
Although the score is high compared to the others in the study, there are clear negative 
drawbacks that need to be addressed.  The UK and Russia received a moderate rating for 
the attempted actions taken to impose penalties; however, the Russian government has 
been labeled weak and the UK did not take action until attacked by terrorists in 2005.  
The political will of both of these states affected their ability to properly respond 
regardless of the ATF regulatory framework in place.  Finally, Saudi Arabia and Sudan 
received the weakest rating because neither country has demonstrated a willingness to 
convict groups and/or people for terrorist financing.  While the Saudis have instituted 
legislation, they have not exercised this portion of the legislation.  In addition, Saudi 
Arabia has not publicly investigated any suspicious activity when connected with the 
royal family.   
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The last factor reflects the unique characteristics and cultural aspects of the cases 
in the study.  The UK and Russia received the strongest rating for restriction on donations 
not because they have impeded civil rights but because these two countries have 
attempted to legislate intentions.  By legislating intent, these two states have attempted to 
create a charitable environment free from association with violent political groups.  The 
U.S. received a moderate rating because while the U.S. does not limit association with 
groups reflecting the American values of unalienable rights under the Constitution, they 
do take action against people and groups who support terrorism.  The U.S. approach 
minimizes rather than increases the protection of legitimate groups.  The last two cases 
received the lowest rating for restrictions placed on donations; however, the lowest rating 
does not necessarily indicate a weak or unprotected environment for charitable giving.  
Sudan received a low rating since they do not restrict donations into the country, yet a 
weak central government and politically charged atmosphere make the charities that are 
present in the country vulnerable to terrorist infiltration.  Saudi Arabia on the other hand 
has and will continue to advocate charitable giving through Islamic charities.  Yet they 
have placed restrictions on how donations are made and how charities operate within the 
financial sector.  As such, Saudi Arabia advocates a free-flow of funds to Islamic 
charities through a regulated system.  This can have positive rather than negative effects 
for Islamic charities and increase their credibility in other states.   
While there are some similarities in the regulatory frameworks owing to the UK 
and U.S. lead on the ATF fight, the differences stem from the political interests of the 
states.  Yet, although the differences in approaches have yielded moderate results in each 
case, there are some lessons learned that could be applied to each case to increase the 
ATF regulatory results while minimizing the negative effects to Islamic charities.    The 
following chapter will examine these lessons learned more fully but briefly they are: 
• One charity regulatory agency achieves better oversight over the sector. 
• One overall list of internationally agreed upon terrorist organizations that 
operate and/or raise funds across borders is more effective in gaining 
collective action and cooperation. 
• A well regulated financial system is costly to both the public and private 
sector yet properly applied can protect the charitable sector from terrorist 
infiltration. 
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• Penalties for noncompliance are effective tools when fairly applied across 
all sectors of society and when due process is afforded to the accused.  By 
allowing due process, the donors and charities do not perceive that they 
are being persecuted or guilty by association, but rather are given the right 
to face their accuser and argue their case.   
Since the regulatory frameworks are predominantly created to increase security, it makes 
sense that certain aspects of civil rights have been impeded.  This is not an endorsement 
of these actions but rather a logical statement that needs to be addressed properly in the 
next chapter.  Finally, since there are cultural aspects to charitable giving in Islam there 
should be due consideration given within the frameworks to protect these organizations 
rather than to put the majority of the burden on them to prove their innocence.   
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IV. LESSONS LEARNED, POLICY PROPOSAL AND 
OVERALL CONCLUSIONS 
A. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
The lessons learned from the comparative analysis are based on a review of the 
ATF regulatory frameworks in the U.S., UK, Russia, Sudan and Saudi Arabia and their 
effect on Islamic charities.  While there are other lessons that can be gleaned from each 
experience, the specific ones mentioned in this thesis can be applied collectively as well 
as individually and are particularly important in the policy options analysis for U.S. 
policy makers.  Before discussing the lessons learned though it is worth examining the 
international ATF efforts and their effectiveness, since the lessons learned suggest that 
collective international action is the most effective method for tackling terrorist financing 
through Islamic charities so as to minimize the negative consequences. 
The primary international agency charged with the creation of a collective ATF 
regime is the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) which was created in 1989 by the G7 
as “…a multilateral government organization focused on setting international standards to 
prevent the laundering of criminal proceeds.”180  The FATF has researched terrorist 
financing, created typologies for Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) to use in their role as 
investigators and monitors, and submitted a set of standards and recommendations for 
states to follow.  In addition, the FATF submitted a second set of special 
recommendations that included a provision for the regulation of NGOs.181  Finally, the 
FATF conducted and published peer evaluations and based on those evaluations made a 
case for imposing certain restrictions and sanctions on a state for noncompliance.  
According to Laura Donohue in regard to the measures taken by the FATF, “What gives 
the measures teeth is the enforcement mechanism in the agreement: the FATF can 
recommend economic sanctions against non-cooperating states and territories.”182  The 
sanctions are used a carrot and stick, in other words as a penalty or incentive for future 
compliance.  According to the Institute for International Economics, “While economic 
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sanctions alone may not dissuade terrorist groups, they may cause states that harbor and 
support terrorist groups to reconsider the extent of their support.”183  Yet, although the 
FATF measures and sanctions have been analyzed as successful and appropriate, the fear 
of sanctions can drive a state to adopt over-inclusive measures that have negative 
consequences as seen with Islamic charities.  Based on the comparative analysis and brief 
discussion on FATF measures, the following are the lessons learned which can be 
converted into options for policy makers. 
1. Single Agency vs. Multiple Agency Approach 
Chapter III covered the effectiveness of the single agency approach employed by 
the UK and Saudi Arabia.  The Charity Commission in the UK and the single agency in 
Saudi Arabia are more effective systems for monitoring and protecting charities than the 
U.S. system which relies on a number of agencies and standards that charities must abide 
by.  Although the U.S. Department of the Treasury is responsible as the primary agency 
for creating standards for NGOs, other agencies are responsible for auditing, registering, 
and monitoring their projects.184 Yet, the success of the single agency approach is 
dependent on their authority and enforcement capability and the political will to act when 
necessary.185  The single agency versus multiple agency approach consolidates and 
streamlines efforts and clarifies standards for charities to operate in.  In addition, a single 
agency that properly certifies and audits charities approaches the problem proactively 
rather than reactively; however, this single lesson learned is not the only answer to 
properly regulating charities while minimizing the negative effects.   
2. One Blacklist of International Terrorist Organizations 
Collective action on the blacklist of international terrorist organizations would 
yield better results than the current patchwork lists that each state creates in addition to 
the UN lists.  Each state and international organization entrusted with ATF has created 
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their own list of organizations that are labeled as terrorists and sanctioned from the 
formal financial sector.  Each state’s list is based on internal as well as external threats.  
While states may believe that this is an appropriate approach, the international terrorist 
threat requires cross-border cooperation.  If one state supports an organization that 
another considers a terrorist organization that does not necessarily pose a threat to the 
listing state, then cooperation issues arise.  For instance, the U.S. has listed Interpal as a 
“specially designated global terrorist” with direct ties to Hamas, yet the UK did not 
consider them a terrorist organization.  In fact, “…two investigations by the British 
Charity Commission, in 1996 and 2003, gave Interpal a clean bill of health.”186  In 
addition, “…the EU found the issue of charitable giving to Palestinian causes a difficult 
problem to resolve…[because]…the EU could not decide if it was possible to 
disassociate the humanitarian from the political activities of a charitable organization.”187 
The more the U.S. pressures other states to take action against groups associated with 
Hamas (which is not necessarily a threat to the continental United States), the less 
assistance the U.S. is likely to get later on.  A better approach would be to operate off of 
one internationally recognized blacklist for those organizations that cross borders.  
Internal lists should only include those organizations that operate within the borders of 
the listing state.   
3. Well Regulated and Transparent Financial Sector 
The analysis showed that although costly, a well regulated financial sector can 
protect the financial sector at a significant cost.  The success is not based on actual 
figures of terrorists caught through the financial sector; rather, NGOs are protected by 
increasing the probability that illegal/criminal entities will be caught through the financial 
sector.  In addition, Islamic charities that operate through the formal financial sector 
leave an audit trail that if monitored properly can flag regulators to illegal transactions.  
Yet, the system has been flooded by suspicious activity reports because banks have been 
forced to absorb the majority of the cost of monitoring the system and fear under-
reporting consequences.  In addition, the typologies submitted by the FATF indicate that 
                                                 
186  Fisher, “Airplane Terrorism Case Prompts Questions about the Work of Islamic Charities in 
Britain,” 1. 
187  Burr and Collins, Alms for Jihad, 222. 
64 
it is extremely difficult to discern terrorist financing from legitimate transactions.188  
Finally, a well regulated and over-inclusive monitoring system may drive terrorist out of 
the formal sector into the poorly monitored informal system.  Between the polar 
opposites of highly suspicious behavior and ordinary business, “…it is possible to design 
intermediate measures that target only a narrow range of transactions that are unusually 
amenable to the purposes of terrorists.”189  For instance, the public and private sector can 
work together to share information through a system of incentives such as tax breaks, 
etc.; however, this will require increased public involvement in the private sector, 
increasing the cost for small returns.190  This lesson is difficult because a well regulated 
system is essential in securing legitimate transactions, but if done correctly is quite 
costly.  According to expert analysis, an increase in human intelligence and cooperation 
with other states can yield the best results given this probability.191   
4. Equally Applied Penalties for Noncompliance and Due Process 
The final lesson learned from the comparative analysis is that states such as Saudi 
Arabia, that have not publicly taken action against suspected terrorist financiers due to 
their ties to the royal family, have decreased the confidence from international partners 
that the Saudis are serious about terrorist financing.192  As a result, ATF measures are 
ineffective since a sector of Saudi society is above reproach.193  Yet, it is important to 
note that western pressure that discounts the cultural and religious aspects of charitable 
giving in Islam may be a part of the problem.  In fact, “King, Crown Princes, and 
princess (of Saudi Arabia) have taken their responsibility to spread Islam throughout the 
world very seriously.”194  The use of blanket policies causes a conflict of interest for the 
Saudi royal family when it comes to punishment or imposition of penalties.195  One 
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possible solution to this conflict of interest is an international standard for state 
responsibility regarding legal culpability for actions of a charity supported by a state and 
operating in other countries.  For instance, Islamic Relief which has its headquarters in 
the UK also has offices in ten other countries.  At the beginning of their annual report 
they states that “The offices [in the other countries] are established as separate 
independent legal entities in their own jurisdictions.”196  By requiring the UK to impose 
legal standards on the charity and its subsidiary offices in other countries, equal 
enforcement is enhanced.   
Equally applied due process is also an essential component that is necessary for 
an effective ATF regulatory framework.  For instance, the U.S. has conducted 
investigations and prosecuted people based on secret evidence.  As a result, assets have 
been frozen and Islamic charities have been closed without the possibility for redress. 
U.S. Courts have upheld the government’s position, and as such, charities must operate in 
an environment that is hostile rather than protective.197  Equal enforcement is an aspect 
of policy that can be monitored and implemented with only small costs.  Yet, political 
issues and rights-based concerns are also important and should be considered during 
policy reformulation. 
B. POLICY OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY MAKERS BASED ON 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
The comparative analysis showed that some of the tools employed by states to 
stem the flow of funds to terrorists were directly derived from anti-money laundering 
regimes.  In addition, the analysis showed that while terrorist financing has similar 
aspects of money-laundering, the regimes are not sufficient to identify and track terrorist 
financing.  Finally, the analysis showed that the regimes actually have a negative 
strategic effect on Muslim communities due to the negative effects felt by Islamic 
charities.  The lessons learned from the comparative analysis can be translated into 
options that U.S. policy makers can adopt to improve the ATF regulatory framework and 
their results and effects on Islamic charities.  Some of the policy options may be 
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unrealistic and others can be implemented without significant controversy.  Yet, none of 
the proposed policy changes will work optimally if implemented separately.  They work 
as an overall plan rather than as singular changes.  There are four proposed policy 
changes, each followed by a discussion on their viability.   
1. Increase U.S. Department of the Treasury Resources and Personnel 
for ATF Efforts 
The first policy change is based on the overall comparative analysis that showed 
that the current ATF efforts have been somewhat ineffective in stemming the flow of 
funds to terrorist organizations and at the same time have alienated Islamic communities 
and Islamic charities.  There needs to be a reevaluation of Treasury’s capability for 
setting standards, training financial officials, and taking a proactive approach with 
Islamic charities to assist them in protecting themselves based on the fact that Treasury 
seems to be overwhelmed.  For instance, you can see this through the hard-to-use 
blacklists that are simply a laundry list of people and aliases without the capability of 
electronically searching the list.198  Another example is Treasury’s reliance on the private 
banking sector for monitoring and reporting which floods the system with suspicious 
reports that they have no hope of being able to sift through with any reliability.  There 
were over 12,000 suspicious activity reports in 2002, and they continue to climb as the 
Federal government continues to impose penalties for under-reporting which in turn 
drives over-reporting.199   
One explanation for Treasury’s inefficiency is that there are only four dedicated 
members of Treasury who are responsible for the entire ATF effort.200  While increasing 
the number of personnel can be costly, the added personnel might produce better results 
and allow Treasury to take a more proactive approach.  This suggestion does not 
necessarily agree with the lesson learned that one dedicated agency is better then multiple 
agencies for monitoring charities.  Yet, for the U.S. it is unrealistic to dismantle the entire 
system and create a new institution that is singularly dedicated to monitoring charities.  
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The current system though can be augmented to increase its capability for providing not 
only crucial government monitoring but also provide charities with assistance and 
protection.  The down side is that increasing the amount of personnel without establishing 
incentives for proper suspicious activity reports or disincentives for over-reporting will 
only increase the number of personnel that sift through the thousands of reports.  
Treasury’s personnel issues and the quality of suspicious activity reports have been the 
subject of Congressional Hearings, and as such, has the most probability of further U.S. 
policy-maker attention.201 
2. Build Partnership between Muslim Community and U.S. Government 
A second policy change involves a partnership between the Muslim community 
and U.S. policy makers in an effort to build understanding and cooperation.  This 
partnership could take shape by building a central clearing house that operates as a 
certifying agency similar to the UK Charity Commission.  Treasury has indicated interest 
in working with a Muslim umbrella group.  For instance,  
Treasury sponsored a gathering that included individuals from the Better 
Business Bureau’s Wise Giving Alliance and the Evangelical Council on 
Financial Accountability to encourage Muslims to follow their models in 
forming an umbrella group under the auspices of an organization like 
ISNA which ultimately would provide some sort of ‘seal of approval’ for 
member groups.  At ISNA’s annual convention in Chicago in the fall 
2004, the representatives of Muslim charities doing work in the US and 
abroad raised concerns about which groups could best lead this effort and 
questioned whether Muslims needed to organize separately in the first 
place.202 
Yet, to date, there has not been a formal pact to work together or form a formal 
partnership between Treasury and Muslim groups.  In contrast, Treasury seems to have 
submitted a list of Muslim groups associated with ISNA to the IRS for investigation, 
rather than work with the group to implement auditing and certifying processes.203   
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Another aspect of the partnership would include a white list of cleared charities to 
rival the blacklisted organizations.  A white list would be a good faith gesture to the 
Muslim community as well as reassure donors that their funds will go to legitimate 
causes.  In essence, a white list in conjunction with blacklists that already exist would 
provide donors and charities with a ‘safe haven’.  Treasury officials argue that they are 
not in the business of policing the charitable sector and would prefer that the charitable 
sector police themselves.  In addition, although Treasury officials maintain that a white 
list would signal to terrorist groups which groups have been cleared and give terrorist 
insight into the government’s intelligence methods, in actuality a white list would do the 
opposite.204  There is no question that terrorist groups shift tactics in step with and ahead 
of investigations, yet a white list would not give them additional information that they 
would not already be able to get elsewhere.  In contrast, a white list would reassure 
donors and charitable groups that the government is willing to work with them rather than 
against them in the protection of charitable funds.   Although a white list would require 
constant attention and recertification, the humanitarian community would benefit greatly 
from this effort.  Of course, this would add to Treasury’s already large workload and 
would require more manpower and resources.  A third party umbrella group could 
provide the top cover as long as Treasury validates the certification process.    
3. Transform U.S. Policy in Regard to Groups that Do Not Pose a Direct 
Threat to the U.S. to Facilitate Collective International Action 
The third policy suggestion is two-fold.  It requires a shift in U.S. foreign policy 
with regard to groups that do not necessarily pose a direct threat to the U.S., and an 
understanding of cultural and political aspects of states in an effort to build collective 
action.  Since a majority of the ATF efforts depend on international collective action, it is 
unproductive for U.S. policy makers to pressure other states to impose penalties on 
groups that have no direct impact on U.S. interests.  For instance, in the case of charitable 
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have been to work with Saudi officials on suspected terrorist connections and ask for 
information rather than pressure Saudi Arabia to take action which would cause a conflict 
of interest.205   
An examination of Congressional Hearings indicated that U.S. policy makers are 
concerned with the negative effects of ATF policies on the humanitarian sector and the 
Islamic humanitarian sector in particular.  In fact, they acknowledged that better 
partnerships and collective action are needed to be successful; however, the hearings 
included generalizations on wahhabism, extremism, madrassas, and other Islamic 
institutions and ideologies.206  Chapter II illustrated the disconnect between western 
understanding of these terms and their meaning in Islam.  In addition, repeated 
generalizations will not increase Saudi cooperation with U.S. policies.  The suggested 
solutions included the creation of FATF regional bodies, and more rigorous ATF laws.  
Yet, the comparative analysis showed that even the U.S. and UK that have strong ATF 
regulatory regimes, are not entirely effective in stemming the flow of funds to terrorists.   
Experts agree that collective action would strengthen the current regimes.207  One 
possible action that would assist in forming these collective bonds would be to actively 
work on an agreed upon definition for international terrorism that can assist states in the 
formulation of policies in line with that definition.208  Yet, even the United Nations “…is 
not able to come up with a definition of terrorism, because much of the world will not 
accept the definition of terrorism that does not exclude all Palestinian extremists from the 
definition.”209   In the absence of an agreed upon definition, states should be required to 
work off of one blacklist of organizations for collective action rather than pressuring 
states to work off of a blacklist formulated by the U.S. that discounts their own interests.  
By working with rather than against other states, the U.S. may increase the quality of 
information and form better partnerships in the ATF fight.  Although this suggestion 
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works against rather than with the current U.S policy of banning all forms of terrorism, it 
would increase the amount of international support for securing charities. 
4. Implement Clear Lines of Authority among U.S. Agencies to Advocate 
Clear ATF Policy and Affect Political Will of Developing States 
Finally, one last policy suggestion is based on the analysis which showed that the 
states that are most vulnerable to terrorist infiltration are those that have weak 
governments and poor ATF regulatory regimes.  These in turn cause a problem for the 
stronger states since funds cross borders and jurisdictions; thus, their ATF efforts are not 
as successful.  The policy suggestion requires U.S. State Department participation in 
affecting the political will of foreign governments such as Sudan.  Yet, the analysis 
shows that the current efforts are not enough.  In reality, charitable groups that have dual 
humanitarian and terrorist missions cannot gain a foothold in a country without the 
explicit or implicit permission of the host government.  This can be given either directly 
or indirectly through formal permission or official disregard for the groups operating in a 
region.   
The current method of enforcing sanctions and imposing significant penalties 
through the formal financial sector have yielded some success but additional diplomatic 
efforts would increase the success of those economic tools.  The U.S. State Department 
has made diplomatic strides; however, their efforts are separate from those made by the 
Treasury department.210  Since the two agencies work independently of each other, their 
ability to successfully affect the political will of foreign governments is diminished.211  A 
better approach to affecting the political will of weak states along with the imposition of 
sanctions and financial sector penalties would be a collective offer of assistance in 
building the proper laws, regimes, and infrastructure to properly monitor the financial 
sector.  Positive steps along with the negative disincentives may increase political will 
and participation.212   
While this policy suggestion is the most logical and positive, it is the least likely 
to be implemented since bureaucratic politics tends to affect the ability for domestic 
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organizations to operate collectively.  In fact, “Officials at the State Department, 
FinCEN, and Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control suggested that cooperation on 
counterterrorist financing was eroding in the area of international technical assistance 
because of interagency problems, particularly with Treasury’s Office of Technical 
Assistance, and a number of personalities.”213  Yet, this policy suggestion comes with the 
least amount of cost and the most impact to collective international efforts.  In addition, 
this suggestion although it has no direct impact on charitable organizations, could 
influence the implementation of the tools internationally to protect the formal financial 
sector and increase charitable security.   
C. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS 
The information in the previous chapters have demonstrated that Islamic charities, 
although they have been associated with terrorist organizations, hold an important role in 
Islam and are a cultural hot-spot that affect the hearts and minds of millions of people and 
numerous states.  Although finding and stopping funds from flowing to terrorist 
organizations are important steps in the fight against terrorism, there are clear 
implications for charitable organizations.  The tension that exists between government 
action to stem the flow of funds to terrorist organizations and charitable Islamic 
organizations are significant and have been the subject of Congressional Hearings, 
nonprofit watchdog organizations, scholars, and the media.  An examination of the ATF 
regulatory regimes in five different states showed that the current individual efforts are 
insufficient in stopping funds from reaching terrorist organizations; the international 
efforts are a reflection of U.S. and UK interests and methods which may be inappropriate 
for the informal financial sector and insufficient for the Arab banking sector; and, the 
implementation of the regulatory regimes create the opposite result from the intended 
strategic goals by alienating the Muslim community from the mainstream charitable 
sector.   
The initial hypothesis regarding the solution to the tension that exists between 
regulatory regimes and Islamic charities was that increased collective international 
action, with an expanded understanding of the role of Islam in governance and charitable 
donations, would go a long way to mitigating the negative consequences to legitimate 
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Islamic NGOs.  The subsequent analysis showed that individual efforts within states have 
had some degree of success in stemming the flow of funds to terrorist organizations, but 
could be much more successful with collective action in certain areas such as 
blacklisting, information sharing, and enforcement of standards and penalties for 
noncompliance.  Yet, the success of the ATF efforts in protecting charities from terrorist 
infiltration while keeping humanitarian efforts open for operation are less successful.  
The significance of this conclusion was discussed in Chapter II.  Essentially, Islamic 
charities hold an important role in both Islamic and non-Islamic states by providing an 
outlet for religious obligations and enhancing personal satisfaction.  In developing states, 
Islamic charities create and support health systems, schools, sustainable development 
projects, and provide support to refugees and victims of violent political conflict.   Yet, 
the ATF regulatory efforts have primarily focused on stopping funds from reaching 
terrorist organizations without regard to their effect on legitimate organizations.  The 
intended result was to create a “safe” environment for charities to operate in; however, 
the results of these efforts actually achieved the opposite effect.  The ATF regimes have 
alienated Muslim communities by negatively affecting the hearts and minds of millions 
of people.  In addition, there is a possibility that future intelligence efforts will not yield 
successful results since the trust and confidence of Muslim communities with 
governments has decreased as a result of ATF efforts.   
As a result of the tensions and problems discussed in Chapter II, Chapter III 
analyzed the regulatory regimes of five states to determine its effectiveness and discover 
weak points that can translate into improvements in the ATF regulatory efforts.  Yet, 
there are obstacles to the implementation of the recommendations both internationally 
and domestically.  In addition there are potential drawbacks that policy makers need to be 
aware of if the suggested changes are implemented.  As previously stated, the most 
important take-away from the analysis is that collective international action is much more 
effective than individual state actions.  Although there are differences in state interests 
with regard to Islamic charities, basic monitoring and auditing standards applied 
collectively could yield positive results.  In addition, increased legal state responsibility 
for entities headquartered in their borders and operating in other countries would increase 
the standards by which charities operate in unregulated and developing states such as 
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Sudan.  Finally, equally enforced penalties for noncompliance would show good faith 
among states and increase confidence in legitimate charities that pass the monitoring 
tests.   
While the suggested changes could yield positive results, there are obstacles to 
implementation of the suggested changes/enhancements.  The UN, as an international 
enforcement institution, lacks the will to enforce standards.  The reason for this is that the 
UN is a reflection of individual state interests rather than an impartial and authoritative 
international organization.  The collective action analysis conducted by Clunan suggests 
that “…the existence of a hegemon or a small group of powerful states that is both 
willing and able to promote and underwrite an international counter-terrorist regime is 
often essential for such a regime to form when states have an incentive to pass the costs 
of the regime off to others.”214  The current structure resembles the international regime 
theory illustrated by Clunan, yet the result of actions taken by the U.S. and UK have 
demonstrated that powerful states have demonized and alienated important groups that 
would be helpful for anti-terrorist efforts; and, collective action has been slow to evolve 
due to diverging interests.  The Saudi Arabia case illustrated this point.  The previously 
suggested tactical collective action through enforcement of standards and monitoring 
regimes is a compromise to the larger and difficult to achieve international collective 
action through an international institution such as the UN. 
Another obstacle that has affected collective international action is the cost-
benefit analysis that governments undertake when weighing which actions to take.   
Additional political and monetary costs can deter governments from taking the steps 
necessary to change their policies.  For instance, most governments are typically reluctant 
to absorb responsibility for the actions of a private institution established in that country 
but operating outside of their borders.  In addition, charitable institutional actions are 
below the scope of state-on-state interactions where other factors are present in the 
strategic relationship between states. Yet, regardless of the additional political and 
monetary costs to a government and the legal restrictions that go along with public 
interest in private business actions, governments should adjust their outlook and consider 
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Islamic and other charities as multi-national corporations.  In this respect charities can 
“…link nations more tightly to one another…” and increase collective action.215  
Although this would cause more state interest into charitable institutional actions and 
increase collective action, a more likely scenario which is exhibited in the current ATF 
effort with regard to charities is that governments impose penalties on private institutions 
if caught engaging in criminal activity.  The responsibility is shifted to the private rather 
than the public sector.   The final and most important obstacle to collective international 
action, which ultimately affects the cost-benefit analysis of states, is the lack of a 
common definition of terrorism and material support for terrorism.  Without a common 
definition, the end result is an unequal and subjective enforcement of standards and 
penalties across states and individual cases.  The common definition is hampered by 
domestic interests, which prohibit the formation of an international agreement on the 
definition of terrorism and material support for terrorism.216    
Domestic obstacles have prohibited states from making changes to the ATF 
regulatory regimes.  Specifically for the U.S., the interagency process and reaction from 
domestic constituencies has dominated policy formulation.  While the recommendations 
would require a change in direction for the Treasury Department, an increase in 
resources, and a streamlining of responsibilities for the ATF effort specifically for 
charitable actions, “…domestic agencies are likely to pursue their bureaucratic interests 
at the expense of the collective effort.”217  Since Treasury is overwhelmed by suspicious 
activity reports and other ATF efforts, they are unable and unwilling to monitor charities 
and certify their legitimacy.  In addition, other U.S. agencies are involved in auditing and 
investigating charities while Treasury is primarily responsible for ATF efforts.  
Bureaucratic politics further affects the ability for all agencies to work together to 
properly offer a safe environment for charities to operate in.   
An increase in resources and expansion of government’s role in private 
institutions could spark a negative reaction from the private sector.  Most private 
institutions want less government involvement rather than more government 
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involvement; however, more government regulation and involvement in the private sector 
would provide the needed top-cover for charities that would reassure donors that their 
money is used for legitimate humanitarian purposes.  While a formal partnership between 
government and the Muslim community would resolve some of the tension, there are 
additional domestic drawbacks to this partnership.  This partnership would entail a third 
party Muslim umbrella group that would monitor and audit charities for the government 
to certify their legitimacy.  In conjunction with this certification, the government could 
produce a ‘white list’ of certified Islamic charities that would further reassure the donor 
population.  The ‘white list’ would need to be reevaluated on a continual basis to prevent 
terrorist infiltration to certified and cleared charities.  While U.S. policy makers have 
showed interest in a partnership with the American Muslim community, they have 
rejected the ‘white list’ suggestion; however, this analysis has shown that a white list 
would provide more benefits for donors, charities and the overall ATF effort.     
Other suggestions for U.S. policy makers included a reevaluation of U.S. policy in 
regard to groups that have cultural and political ties to ATF partner states and have no 
direct impact to U.S. security.  This recommendation is dependent on the political 
outlook of the policy makers.  In other words, if the policy makers are realists that are 
purely concerned with U.S. security interests in the narrowest sense, then a reevaluation 
is possible. Yet, if policy makers are idealists who both believe in a broader security 
definition for the U.S. and its allies and are backed by an equally idealistic constituency 
base, then a reevaluation is not possible.218  In either case, the reevaluation is dependent 
on the personalities and constituencies present.  The recommendation that states should 
operate off of one consolidated international blacklist for groups that operate 
internationally, while maintaining their own domestic lists for purely domestic actors 
would facilitate the reevaluation of domestic policies.  This suggestion is a realistic 
approach to ATF.  It acknowledges that not all states have equal interests and that the 
U.S. should focus on efforts that directly increase U.S. security without alienating 
international partners that are essential in the collective effort.  This suggestion above all 
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others does not require an expansion of government agencies, nor require additional 
resources and would actually have the greatest impact on the collective effort.   
Further study regarding the suggested solutions is required to examine whether 
the intended results are achievable; however, the analysis showed that Islamic charities 
have been negatively effected; donor confidence is down due to ATF efforts; states’ 
efforts have not yielded optimal results; and, collective action is essential in both 
stemming the flow of funds to terrorist organizations and securing the charitable 
environment.  The U.S. can lead the effort by reexamining the results of their efforts, not 
based on assets frozen but rather on amount of groups protected from terrorist infiltration 
due to ATF regulatory regimes.  A reevaluation is the first step in a good faith effort to 
protect Islamic charities both from terrorists and unintentional consequences from 
government action. 
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